Simorgh | Wisdom, Governance, Identity — a conversation between Mehdi Motaharnia and Dr. Ali-Asghar Pourazzat on Abdi Media

Political wings and playing with national interests

Pourazzat: In the Pahlavi era, however you look at it, capitulation (capitulations) is indefensible.

Motaharnia: In Iran I regard neither the right flank as truly right nor the left flank as truly left — they all act a role to be able to protect their own interests at the national level, not the national interest.

Pourazzat: Now you have stereotyped and accused others. When I wanted to check whether the device was off or not you said I caused that few-second delay.

Motaharnia: I said you caused a few seconds.

Pourazzat: As a ruler you quickly accused someone else.

Motaharnia: I am not the ruler here, doctor — you assume mistakenly.

Pourazzat: Let us set up a governance court right here. You say I am not the ruler here — brother, you who are behind the camera, do you take orders from me or from him? The first parliamentarian could have said this; the second must study whether previous representatives implemented their slogans — it was possible; who prevents it?

Motaharnia: I want to ask a question to bring the discussion back.

Pourazzat: You go to the margins.

Motaharnia: You cause me to go to the margins.

The Simorgh program is a work of the Simorgh Future-Studies think-tank together with Abdi Media. Abdollah Abdi was one of my good students in the 1990s, and when he heard I wanted to explore the thoughts of Iran’s living thinkers about Iran’s future — especially to make the first part of this series about future governance — he agreed and joined me, and I joined him, so that this series could be produced. We hope these programs can help to unpack the various dimensions of the thinking of many intellectuals in today’s Iran and map their intellectual spheres across different aspects of their views, learn from them, and leave a valuable collection for future generations.

Today, at this hour and in this studio, Dr. Ali-Asghar Pourazzat sits beside me. He is a professor of management at the Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, and I have had the privilege to learn alongside him and sit in his class as a student. The title I chose for Dr. Pourazzat is “Wisdom, Governance and Identity — from Public Management to the Future of Iran.”

We are in a condition of declining public trust — isn’t that so? In a situation of declining public trust, what does public administration mean?

Pourazzat: The phenomenon of declining public trust is global; every country may experience manifestations of declining public trust. It is worth emphasizing that studies on public trust in Iran, as far as I recall, date back to Dr. Hassan Danaeifard’s studies in the 1990s (meaning roughly the 1980s onward), and after him other colleagues began. (Note: in Persian the “90s” refers to 1381–1390; in English usage it’s sometimes 1991–1999, causing occasional translation errors and decade shifts.)

This decline is seen worldwide. Successful countries — those more successful in nation-building and state-building — try, relying on reason, to create conditions for the restoration or enhancement of public trust. You know that publicity stunts may temporarily raise public trust: for example, a president promising things and partially fulfilling them, and various public figures from actors to restaurateurs or hoteliers playing that role. But what builds durable public trust is provision of welfare, security and awareness — these three words I borrow as a knowledge stock from Nahj al-Balaghah. There you see that the conditions for establishing and sustaining government return to removing the people’s hardship: explicitly in that text Malik al-Ashtar is told to beware that the ruin of the land is caused by people’s poverty. When people become impoverished and governors are intent on accumulating wealth and preserving their own position, they will not have high resolve to promote people’s security, awareness and welfare, and people will lose trust in the rulers and no longer believe they are a stable base.

Public opinion is very important; there is a beautiful expression in Nahj al-Balaghah: the levels of religion and the masses of Muslims are the general populace in the face of enemies — the common people matter, and their opinion matters; it determines how successful rulers have been.

Relation of public trust and religious governance

Motaharnia: You believe public trust has declined globally — I cannot deny that public trust is relative and can be defined and changed within different systems and governmental organizations. That’s fine; but if it has happened elsewhere, can that be a license for a system that had claimed it could build both our worldly and otherworldly life — the best system, even superior to the early Islamic religious governance under Ali ibn Abi Talib, which you cited in Nahj al-Balaghah — can that be a justification for allowing public trust to fall to the present level? In countries that claim democracy repression occurs — is that a license to repress?

Pourazzat: Your argument has two sides. One is whether there is any authorization for the decline of public trust. No ruler, even an autocrat, wants public trust to fall — decline of public trust is not his desire but a coercive effect of his performance. So it is not something we can say was created by our will; it results from our performance.

If we review Iran, its future and public trust historically, our country in a sense is the foundation of empires — monarchy and kings began here. I think this cannot be denied in history. Other civilizations existed with urban structures before us, but the term monarchy/empire as such is not seen earlier than Iran.

From modern state to Cyrus’s legacy

Motaharnia: First, Iranians formed the modern state and they name Cyrus.

Pourazzat: In a sense we can say that the traditions Cyrus left were so respected that many religious people refer to him, and even the idea formed that the Qur’anic Dhul-Qarnayn might be the Iranian Cyrus. His traces are respected and the sentences attributed to him, even if not precisely accurate, create a powerful image. For example: a king who does not know how his people pass the night and reach the morning is a nameless gravedigger who trusts knowledge — interestingly, ‘trusts knowledge’.

Motaharnia: That is precisely what you referred to in Malik al-Ashtar: welfare, security and knowledge.

Pourazzat: The point is he says the burial of knowledge — not the burial of people’s bodies. When people become hungry their knowledge seems to quickly decay; they surrender to a ruler who ignores people’s economy and welfare and devalues dignified life. Whoever utters such words deserves respect. In Achaemenid relics we find statements that indicate a healthy political mindset. That mindset deteriorates with the decline of justice, civil rights and public trust. This steep decline is evident in the face of Alexander: Darius III fails to muster a cohesive army and a resilient nation that can withstand Alexander, who initially was treated as a toy. Brave generals like Ariobarzanes achieve little; even commanders who stand to the end cannot prevail. Here I want to point to the continuing relation between politician and soldier: if the politician leans toward compromise — compromise for personal interests and preserving power — those who stand for the people suffer. Why are border-defenders important? From Achaemenids to today, check whether they were trusted by the people.

Mythic figures like Arash the Archer show that the border-guardian stands with all his being and honor. In the time of Imam Sajjad…

Defending borders and national values

Motaharnia: What prayer is there for border-defenders?

Pourazzat: At what time? Border-defenders who are part of an army whose entire noble family was massacred and treated so criminally that historical shame befell that region — people turned against the savior family and behaved inhumanly. At that time, under the dominance of some of the most brazen armies in the world, Imam Sajjad prays for the defenders. This is instructive because if border defenders collapse, the country falls under others’ hooves. Move to the Sassanid era: as long as an appearance of justice was preserved — and I do not think you can narrate the same level of justice after Cyrus — the early Sassanid rulers had less of Cyrus’s far-reaching sagacity. Yet there were moments trying to portray a ruler as just (e.g., Anushirvan stories). Even if not true, it is valuable that people think their king is just. If a nation reaches the point of praising Machiavellian cruelty, what will the system produce?

From the Sassanids downward, the lowest level of social security, awareness, welfare and public trust arrives at Yazdegerd III, who collapses easily before the Arab army. I emphasize this was an Arab army, not Islam per se — very brutal raids, sometimes by tribes not even fully Muslim — and their savagery was not Islamic civilization. That brutal looting recurred.

During Arab dominance various political currents appeared; the most consequential that led to state formation much later was the Khwarezmian-like groups. You again see so much royal tyranny and public trust decline that it mattered little whether Turkmen or Mongol ravaged; collapse occurred. Public trust declined and collapse followed.

Later historical periods showed ups and downs. Iran, from Afghanistan to Europe, China to Rome, experienced both tyranny and justice in different regions and times. So general judgments across all geography are wrong; one must narrate each specific temporal and spatial situation. For example, Rezā Khan’s era differed between Shiraz and Kerman; same in Mongol times.

You know that the presence of Iranian viziers, building observatories, founding universities and schools moved the Mongols from plunder toward civilization; Mongol rulers assimilated into Iranian society, though generations suffered greatly. The narrative of our ancestors’ suffering is vast — the story of the Sarbedaran, of scholars burned and killed — history often records the kings who were the perpetrators.

After the revival of Iranian civilization, the rise of Nader, the Zand and Safavid eras, a major collapse occurred in the Safavid period: internal collapse in a peculiar form. This is rare — in many countries coups happen but governance continues; here banditry seized parts and wrought atrocities, notably in Isfahan — see Seyyed Javad Tabatabai’s The Defeat of Isfahan. I trace a model of wise governance from Achaemenids to now. The Safavid decline shows how a powerful military state can still fall due to internal governance failure.

Courtly structural corruption historically

Motaharnia: In the harem.

Pourazzat: In that court anyone who attained power was often executed by his father; kings killed their sons to prevent recurrence, which reduced the number of capable, prudent elites. Weak kings succeeded, and strong commanders were killed or imprisoned; court eunuchs gained power. Internal decay led to collapse against invading marauders. The Qajar period partially repeated this collapse: territories detached — Azerbaijan to Turkestan, parts of the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Iraq and parts of Anatolia — the plateau lost lands.

Motaharnia: The Iranian plateau lost land.

Pourazzat: A partial disintegration occurred while rulers enjoyed comfort and foreign travel — imagine a king absent three months. The Pahlavi era followed: however you defend it, capitulation is indefensible; such phenomena indicate soft collapse. Those who lived then sensed it — such accumulation of feeling fed repeated thoughts of systemic change: nationalist, Islamist or leftist.

Bribery and power plays in late Pahlavi decade

Motaharnia: But in the last decade he said ‘we won’t pay tribute to the blue-eyed ones’ and ‘the English conspire against me’ — how can we reconstruct that?

Pourazzat: You mean Mohammad Reza; he expressed such ideas and sometimes acted seriously, losing Western support.

Confrontation of the West with the Shah

Motaharnia: Not only lost support but confrontation began. You did a longue durée study but my question remains.

Pourazzat: The point of your talk is to understand that sovereignty, governance and ruling are more complex than monitoring one person as king. I said this to reach today and the future: what can cause another civilizational collapse, and what preserves us? National cohesion, national and religious beliefs, anything that fosters belonging, anything that builds people’s trust in government, anything that builds rulers’ trust in people — these sacralize governance and keep it from degradation toward wisdom.

What you observe today in the power exchange among claimants can be related outwardly: often domestic hardliners and foreign hardliners seem to play ping-pong, passing the ball.

Motaharnia: It’s not ping-pong — it’s a 400-meter race.

Pourazzat: They perform crude acts that outwardly oppose each other but inwardly secure each other’s survival or justify each other’s existence.

Wisdom: the missing link in today’s governance

Motaharnia: I’m interested in this longue durée you presented, Dr. Pourazzat. We need both archaeology and genealogy of the past to learn precious lessons. My point is: the Islamic Republic promised a unique theodemocratic governance — claiming a unique role even superior to early Islamic governance under Ali, as you cited in Nahj al-Balaghah. If so, why has public trust declined? We cannot say that because it happened in history or abroad, therefore inside a system that defines itself as unique this should occur. I often hear about wise leadership from you. We must pay attention to speaking wisely, to leadership and management. Claiming ideals and drafting visions and plans is one thing — but does the current governance allow room for wisdom? Can we count on wisdom to finance and build the future? I mean both financing and building. Can the wise leadership and management we see guarantee construction and stewardship of the future given the present level of public trust?

Pourazzat: You want me to judge the present situation.

Motaharnia: Not judge, evaluate.

Pourazzat: I think such evaluation must be done. First point: stereotyping. Were all Pahlavi actions bad? The army, universities, health and school revivals were respectable post-Qajar achievements. Yet major economic mistakes occurred: collapse of traditional farms and an imperfect quasi-socialist redistribution in the White Revolution. See the consequences: many honest investors fled or lost power. What replaced them could not perform as before — e.g., the auto industry never reached credibility to sell regionally without political pressure. People have bitter experiences of those excesses. But the country needed freedom and recovery and could not accept hereditary, irrational rule. Post-that rupture, trial and error dominated until the war shifted priorities and marginalized many political demands.

Reconstruction and Post-War Consequences

Pourazzat: After the war (1988), the so-called reconstruction era followed the same path, and it seemed as if letting personal preferences dominate became a routine. Look at the post-war trajectories: the first group that came to power did so under the claim of reconstruction, with a partial claim to technocracy — though we know this term cannot be precisely applied to them. This group failed to bring progress to the country and could not establish the economic liberalism it claimed. In their privatization approach, there were numerous mistakes, which led to the emergence of new economic groups that remain extremely dominant to this day.

Motaharnia: They created an oligarchy that acted like a mafia.

Pourazzat: The benefits that emerged — for example, from the confiscation of the assets of individuals linked to the previous regime — were transferred to people who had no organic connection to the core of the nation. Of course, these transfers were carried out through auctions, tenders, and transactions. If you look now, many of the giant companies that exist today are indebted to that period, while those who gained such wealth neither worked for it nor had a tradition of creating it. These groups took control of key sectors of the country’s power. They even managed to send their representatives to parliament. Now, with social media, you personally have more power, but behind that power lies conflict. I’ve seen you sometimes declare, “Now I can speak directly with the people.” This isn’t a power you created; information technology gave you this power.

Motaharnia: It gives you power too — you can use it. So, let me ask you: does the current governance have the capacity and ability to build the future or not?

Pourazzat: I’m worried that you might think I want to judge conservatively. I hope, at least given our long acquaintance — I think it has been about 20 years now (since around 2005) — that I can speak fairly. To speak fairly, you must be able to move away from clichés. If we do that, you can describe both the right and left wings of the country under one label.

Motaharnia: In Iran, I don’t consider the right truly “right” nor the left truly “left.” They’re all acting out roles in order to protect their own national interests in the national arena, not the nation’s interest.

Pourazzat: But you’ve created a cliché. Within both the right and the left, I see honorable people who care deeply about Iran’s future — perhaps even more ready to sacrifice than you or me.

Motaharnia: What I’m critiquing is the dominant discourse. I’m not denying that good individuals exist in both wings. But the prevailing discourse of the right and the left is what I criticize, not each individual.

Pourazzat: An entire nation cannot pretend. A political wing cannot pretend. An individual can pretend. You and I could pretend right now.

Motaharnia: Why couldn’t an entire wing pretend? In the statements it produces and reproduces, can’t it?

Pourazzat: But among the produced and reproduced statements, aren’t there loyal people who truly believe in them? Those people are living their real roles, not acting.

Three Concepts of Governance: Transcendent, Demonic, and the Court of Governance

Motaharnia: Yet, the discourse of “acting” has caused many to leave those camps. Many who once called themselves conservatives are no longer conservatives, and many who once called themselves reformists are no longer reformists. These wings have produced statements to which they were not committed. Because they were not committed, they were essentially acting.

Pourazzat: That’s exactly where we arrive: the left came to power but was not committed to its slogans; the right came to power but was not committed to its slogans. Let me propose three concepts that may help:

Transcendent Documents

Demonic Documents

The Court of Governance

In the transcendent documents, we encounter rulers who promise: We will do this and that; we will bring progress; we will build; we will give everyone some money; we will give these privileges to all; Iran will become paradise. You’ve seen this often in the world, even in stories — many make promises to come to power.

Now, should they be bound to those promises? Think about it. Governance exists before a nation because promises were made, and from them, rulers derived power. This itself is a great achievement. Until now, even through distorted votes, we had not established such a system. Here, individuals make promises, receive votes and legitimacy from others. You’ve seen how in many cases, those who give legitimacy do so with full enthusiasm — whether when my opponent wins or when my preferred candidate wins.

I remember presidents whom I personally did not support, but they still had strong backing, and I did not see them as wise leaders. On the other hand, presidents I supported seemed better — meaning wiser than their successors — and they came with heavy public backing. But the promises they made were not fulfilled. When asked why, they said: “God did not will it.”

To accuse God in this way is fundamentally opposed to the core of Shi‘i beliefs. To say, “I was compelled” is false. To say, “I am free” is also incomplete. But to say, “God wanted it this way” is a great injustice.

Motaharnia: The riddle of Omar and the disobedient one.

Pourazzat: It is a great injustice to the sacred presence of God.

Motaharnia: Omar and Amr told Muawiya: whatever you see fail, say God did not will it — attribute it to God.

Pourazzat: I heard this in a film narration; I did not find it in the precise collections of traditions.

Motaharnia: It’s not a bad proposition — it’s Islamic Machiavellianism; in any case, if Mirbagheri brings it up, it’s fine: attribute everything to God.

Pourazzat: The demonic [approach] is when I say, “Why didn’t you arrive on time? You make excuses: the agents of global arrogance prevented it.” Today, in reality, you managed things a few minutes later — as a ruler who governs, the film and the system are at your disposal. You accused others; you even accused me. When I wanted to check whether the device was off or not, you said I caused that several-second delay — that delay was caused by you. As a ruler here you quickly blamed someone else. You have learned this method from living under current conditions — that is, you have learned to accuse God or the agents of global arrogance, this fictional character, constantly flaunt this phantom, and attribute your own weakness to it. Here you are the embodiment of governance in this domain.

Border between accusation and responsibility in management

Motaharnia: I am not the ruler here and, doctor, you are making a mistaken assumption.

Pourazzat: Let us set up the court of governance right here. You say I am not the ruler here — my brother, you who are behind the camera, do you take orders from me or from him?

Motaharnia: I take orders from the studio manager.

Pourazzat: If he says he wants the program to continue and to be lengthened, would you accept that? Yes, you would accept.

Motaharnia: Then I will continue; you cannot cut me off.

Pourazzat: I will cut you off.

Motaharnia: I have become the ruler; I have taken over governance and will continue the program without interruption. The true ruler must cut [the program]. Thus rulers do not accept governance, they do not accept the responsibility of governance and attribute it to others. Dr. Pourazzat, we have been discussing these matters for twenty years. Dr. Pourazzat has a deep devotion to religious and theological propositions; religion sits in its transcendental position — religion is the Godward part of life, accepted in human existence. When one becomes religious, one accepts religion.

Pourazzat: I wanted, by way of concluding this discussion, to present the third proposition: what is the court of governance? Everything you claim at the start of a presidency or at the start of a parliamentary term forms the basis by which at the end of the term you must answer to the people. With those claims and slogans we can evaluate you. Moreover, the manifesto of the party that supported you stands behind you — these are indices by which a court may be convened and, for example, challenge Mr. Motaharnia.

Motaharnia: The doctor said that the discourses constructed in the two political wings cannot actually attain a position of supremacy for individuals. I said these discourses are important and that they perform — as theater. Now you said they should be brought to trial. Yes, there are people in both wings who are committed to those transcendent or ideal propositions, and some have left for that reason. Many of my friends were conservatives, many were reformists — he knows both; for at least twenty years he knows them — I have criticized them in meetings and classes. But that criticism was not of people who were truly committed to those propositions, even if I did not accept those propositions. The discourses that exist inherently mean the ruler tells me to cut [the program].

Pourazzat: I did not accept being your citizen. Properly define the two beautiful concepts and propositions of enjoining good and forbidding wrong — a ruler cannot dominate.

Motaharnia: Again he used religious propositions, staged a coup against all the governors, and still does not let the program finish — that is, he does the same thing that Medici says in chapter eight: if you want to rule over the people, place religious propositions in a transcendental position, stand behind them and use them. Both Dr. Pourazzat with this trick deprived us of governance, and the real ruler just acts on his own.

Pourazzat: I did not label you at all, but you labeled me. You compared me to a personality I cannot be compared to.

Motaharnia: He and I are very close besides the fact that he was my professor; do not take these remarks seriously. But what is important here is to see what verbal and propositional games bring about for our little discussion of governance — imagine what happens in larger arenas.

Pourazzat: When complexity in society increases and the number of actors grows, reaching consensus and a single defensible judgement becomes that much harder.

Motaharnia: I remembered a proposition that Dr. Pourazzat used to say in class: “You are all free to follow me,” so I remembered our program together before this — you saw everything, you are free to follow me.

Pourazzat: I must defend: the late Seyyed Javad Tabatabai used to say that translating democracy as “rule of law” is more accurate than translating it as “rule of the people.” That “obedience” I mentioned was aimed at preserving the classroom’s values against flighty students.

Motaharnia: So he interpreted law to his own advantage, and now he interprets governance to his own advantage. I have no doubt I am no match for him — we have had these discussions for twenty years and in the end we reach nowhere.

Pourazzat: Because I intend not to label, I will not respond.

Motaharnia: I defined psychological operations — manipulation at the threshold, the suggestion-engineering of people — it manipulates so beautifully, let us learn from this professor.

Pourazzat: The domain of knowledge helps us escape this condition. In governance assessment different sciences help: when we want to assess the environment, environmental propositions and ecosystems assist; when we speak of welfare, economic propositions help. But in all of these logic and mathematics are helpful — numbers and quantitative inferences derived from logic, analogy, establishment, and degree of certainty of these two.

Motaharnia: Sometimes metaphor also helps.

Pourazzat: Metaphor is misleading, and Aristotle differs from Socrates for this reason; he cannot tolerate the greatness of Socrates’ pure, truth-oriented thought and does not even respect his rank.

Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in governance

Motaharnia: Where does Socrates diverge from Plato? There is a triad that is closer to Socrates than to Plato.

Pourazzat: Aristotle has no sympathy with Socrates.

Motaharnia: The nature of God, the definition of man, are positions where Aristotle and Plato converge; both in some respects are closer to Socrates.

Pourazzat: Aristotle is particularist, precise, empiricist and experimentalist. The Platonic view is holistic and aims to grasp the essence of phenomena and even to project an essence of perceived reality onto phenomena — which does not always fit the truth of phenomena. But to explain some concepts that enter the human mind yet cannot be justified — phenomena not directly observable but present in mind, such as understanding mercy or kindness — why was a word like kindness created? Or where did the concept of justice come from? Socrates essentially abandons party, faction or method and, through questioning, seeks to discover truth, trying not to stop in one place. This is unbearable both for rulers and for scholars who, through allegiance to an intellectual current, protect their rank or prestige — they do not want Socratic thought to endanger them; therefore Socrates has few supporters among either the scholars or the politicians of his time, except those who carried his intellectual tradition in certain ways. Consider these three modes and then move to the Middle Ages.

Motaharnia: What happened to Aristotle — is he closer to Socrates or to Plato?

Pourazzat: To neither, but because he is committed to Plato he does not insult Plato.

Motaharnia: Did he insult Socrates? I did not see that.

Pourazzat: From whom is that analogy? “A horse is a speaking animal; man is a speaking animal; Socrates is a man; Socrates is a speaking animal.” It’s not a direct insult; did I set the professor as an example for this tolerant proposition? Why did I not say Plato?

Motaharnia: In my view he respects Socrates, not Socrates himself.

Pourazzat: I did not infer that, and because I do not have precise evidence and am not familiar with the historical transitions in these two philosophies, I stop here and make no claim.

Motaharnia: Henry Thomas, in *Great Philosophers* (co-authored with Donal Thomas), simply presents this; Henry has another book on these philosophers. Three principles separate Plato and Aristotle: one is the theory of forms, another is God and the nature of God. Plato’s God is creator-and-abandoner, a maker who then withdraws, while Aristotle’s God is creator and ever-present; thus he says God is the desirable object. Here is a metaphor: God is not an object that draws its seeker toward itself — “We belong to God and to Him we return” comes from this. The Aristotelian human is a creature of disposition, predatory but educable; the Platonic human is inherently good-natured and more receptive to education because he has learned before — what he learns is recollection, whereas Aristotle rejects that. Dr. Pourazzat rightly said to look at Raphael’s painting: Aristotle holds *Physics*, Plato holds *The Republic*; thus Plato looks to the heavens while Aristotle points to the earth. So Plato thinks analogically while Aristotle thinks inductively and terrestrially.

Pourazzat: Socrates stands beyond both in the search for truth.

Motaharnia: He presented philosophy before his students; they said man is the manifestation of knowledge, so knowledge returns to human comprehension. Socrates came from elite Athenian society; metics and others worked and he was well-off and could support his two wives; he had a good life and always debated, whereas many had to write contracts and practice law to earn money; Antiphon left love affairs to do petition-writing and advocacy, so he took money to support his life.

Pourazzat: Many people in the worst economic conditions have preserved the authenticity of their character.

Motaharnia: I say they said that; Socrates opposed them — instead of being a sophist he said he was a lover of truth.

Pourazzat: I worry about narration because every narration may to some degree involve projection. I read a book by Brian who compared ancient thinkers to their current narrators and interviewed those narrators; cleverly using technology he placed half-century-old photos of new narrators next to statues, giving the impression that the new narrator resembles the statue. The reality is that neither those statues are the truth of Plato and Aristotle nor this photograph is your truth in a moment. But juxtaposing them suggests the narrator has become like Aristotle or Plato. My worry is that the narrator imposes his own intellectual interests; the narrated idea becomes sacrificed. If we accept even a little, perhaps my present talk about Plato, Aristotle and Socrates is partially manipulated.

Motaharnia: This is the link of the horizons you mention.

Pourazzat: Moving forward we observe that a decompositional, idealist, precise and calculative school beautifully appears in Sina’i’s thought: the world must be computable, every pain has a cause and a remedy, and the confidence that a remedy exists has a theological backing. Opposed to Plato emerges an illuminative view — in this view, rather than resorting to the visible, one appeals to the primordial covenant (al-alast), and this manifestation of the divine names in Islamic mysticism holds that even if we do not perceive phenomena, they are manifestations of His Names, and He makes man the trustee, responsible and committed to narrate his own truth by revealing the Names. We arrive at Descartes who organizes Socratic questioning into a more systematic intellectual apparatus and gifts that questioning. Today, when we consider ancient or new historical phenomena, how much distortion exists and how likely is it that I erred? Did I hear a wrong narration, or heard correctly but misremember and misstate it, or deliberately misstate it, or do I state accurately what I saw and understood? Nahj al-Balaghah provides such four categories in its treatment of narrations.

Motaharnia: In any case Plato points to a transcendent realm whose primacy is real, and what we see on earth are shadows of that external primacy.

Pourazzat: I wanted to point to clichés here: the clichés I make about these people are not accurate and never narrate their truth. Perhaps the postmodern critique that truth is sometimes distorted and localized and its meaning should be local and limited has merit. When Mr. Motaharnia narrates Pourazzat, that narrative differs from the living truth of Pourazzat who stands before him.

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Narrative, Truth, and the Limits of Storytelling

Motaharnia: I agree with your point about the "fusion of horizons." Today, in the 21st century, we want to narrate events that happened twenty centuries ago—or at least fifteen centuries ago. We become narrators who cannot reflect the whole truth. This is an inescapable reality, but nonetheless, the narration happens. How was the scene of Karbala? How was Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib struck? Does everything in Nahj al-Balagha literally belong to Imam Ali, or were some things added later? This claim even exists regarding the Qur’an.

PourEzzat: But it has never been accepted.

Motaharnia: Yes, it is said to be a claim. I’m not saying whether it is right or wrong.

PourEzzat: Because they could not imitate the order and composition of the Qur’an.

Motaharnia: For example, today you cannot reconstruct Homer’s Odyssey.

PourEzzat: In Al-Mizan tafsir, it is boldly stated that every Bismillah al-Rahman al-Rahim in each surah has a unique contextual meaning, and none is repetitive. You cannot equate the Bismillah in Surah al-Fatiha with that in Surah al-Baqara. We know that there is no repetition in God’s creation. That’s why we marvel that no two snowflakes are alike.

Motaharnia: Just as no two brains share the same frequency.

PourEzzat: These are the principles by which we live. Plants grow steadily, drawing from the light. These are universal laws governing creation.

Motaharnia: In administration and organization, you have vast experience. Do we have a bureaucracy that is bloated yet efficient, or bloated and inefficient? What should the administrative system of the future look like?

PourEzzat: We have a “chaotic bureaucracy.” Every party that comes to power makes promises at the expense of the people. The slogans announced publicly before the nation are not bound to be fulfilled—because the “nation” is an abstract entity. But with party cadres, the commitment is explicit: you have promised them a post. When these promises are implemented by MPs, presidents, or affiliates, bureaucracy becomes strangely inflated. Since this expansion lacks rational order, it is never normal growth—it is a pathological inflation.
Think of potatoes growing underground: they take odd shapes depending on the soil. Their strange form comes from the soil, not their essence. Where the soil is soft, they grow larger.

Motaharnia: Material is placed in an environment and is shaped by it.

PourEzzat: Political parties act the same way. When they find space, when parliament aligns with them, when cultural systems of governance align, they dominate and impose themselves.

Bureaucracy and Digital Transformation

Motaharnia: You believe in administrative digitalization. But is it possible without cultural and intellectual transformation? Or is it just decorative talk?

PourEzzat: The biggest flaw of fragmented sciences is that they impose abstract thinking. In physics or chemistry, experiments are predictable and repeatable. But humans are not like that. Humans, parties, citizens—they change their behavior. Many evade responsibility in three ways: blaming God, blaming Satan, or avoiding facing their own commitments.

Motaharnia: Such people lack integrity.

PourEzzat: We need a “governance index” as a kind of medicine, obliging rulers to be accountable from start to finish. Of course, many slogans arise from ignorance of what governance truly is. You cannot measure such a vast phenomenon in a piecemeal manner—sometimes you see only a part, sometimes only a dimension. It is like people in darkness trying to describe an elephant by touching different parts.

Motaharnia: Exactly—each one describes the part they touched. You criticized “technological obsession.” In your view, how can a balance between technology and virtue be achieved in future governance, especially within a chaotic bureaucratic system?

PourEzzat: Your question forces me into defense. Why didn’t the School of Governance, where I served as dean, succeed fully? Because many claimants in political science and management had bureaucratic power to disrupt the plan. We resisted, but our energy was drained. Still, we began the effort. Even if we could not achieve everything, at least we raised the essential question: Must a ruler act rationally and wisely? We tried to depict the different dimensions of wisdom so as to make rulers, as far as possible, accountable.

Governance as the Fruit of Wisdom

Motaharnia: I consider governance the product of wisdom. Wisdom itself is the result of knowledge, understanding, perception, transformation into insight, and creativity. A sage who becomes a ruler must act wisely. It is like saying ice is cold—coldness is part of its essence. Likewise, governance is inherently tied to wisdom. Can governance be separated from its very essence, which is wisdom?

PourEzzat: That is a Platonic view. But there is another perspective: we deal with average human beings with limited abilities, who act through trial and error. The question is how to prevent them from repeating their mistakes. You’ve probably heard the story of the skewer and the stove—it is said in a book’s introduction that we shouldn’t aim to create flawless governments. Instead, we must establish mechanisms so that if an ordinary government becomes corrupt or deviates, it can be removed without bloodshed.

Motaharnia: Popper says we must be able to dismiss governments without bloodshed.

PourEzzat: Yes. I don’t recall whether I saw it in the main text, in a dialogue, or in a translator’s preface, but it’s in that book. Interestingly, this aligns with his epistemology: instead of seeking proof, he emphasized providing falsifiable and testable propositions to the scientific community. In fact, his “critical rationalism” invites us to challenge logical propositions.

Motaharnia: Falsifiability.

PourEzzat: Exactly. The point is not whether your government is right or wrong in a specific case. Rather, we should ask: how can we evaluate your government, and how can we do it precisely? By the way, you smiled—what did that smile mean?

Motaharnia: I was showing an “adult” personality—not a child, not a parent. An adult refers to reasoning. You wanted to attribute governance to me again, and I laughed, showing that you’re still attributing it, and then you accuse me of something.

PourEzzat: People rarely have a fixed psychological type. Even while you tried to behave as an adult, you also acted joyfully.

Motaharnia: A joyful child is consciously employed by the adult. Maturity is about being able to use both at the right time and in the right context. I used it deliberately, in a mature way.

PourEzzat: I accept your defense completely.

Motaharnia: I am someone who consciously does these things. Do you want to use this against me? You’re saying I think in a Platonic way.

PourEzzat: That’s not what I said. My point was that we encounter psychological archetypes—child, adult, parent.

Motaharnia: I used adulthood to draw upon the joyful child.

PourEzzat: But you also said, “I’m not a child,” while actually acting childlike for a moment. That shows you don’t fit rigid archetypes—your personality is unique.

Motaharnia: You want to put me back into a box and define who I am.

PourEzzat: My point is that every human being is unique. No psychological model can fit all individuals exactly. Still, there are shared principles that allow us to live together—for example, respect. Labels and jokes are understood by listeners as jokes, not stigmas. But the key is this: no government can be judged by clichés. Each one must be assessed based on its promises, its legal framework, and its context.

The School of Governance was established to enhance our capacity to understand governance here and now, using scenarios to anticipate challenges of the future. Think of martial arts: practitioners repeat kata thousands of times so that in real combat they can create techniques spontaneously. Governance training is similar—it prepares leaders to improvise wisely in unexpected situations, like facing a figure such as Trump.

Charismatic vs. Algorithmic Leadership

Motaharnia: Do we have wise leaders inside the system? Which is better for Iran’s future—charismatic leadership or algorithmic leadership?

PourEzzat: In the tradition of Imam Ali, charismatic leadership is not the focus. He adhered to two main approaches respected by different Islamic groups. One was tradition—he preserved traditions, even flawed ones that harmed his government. He defended his legitimacy by emphasizing rational traditions of his time.

Today, if we want governance to become transcendent, we must adhere to at least four principles that always respect people’s rights. Justice based on rights means ensuring every individual has minimum welfare, sufficient awareness, and maximum security. In a healthy society, if even one person suffers from a burden they cannot resolve alone, the entire society is responsible.

Governments—whether left or right—are accountable. True governance demands responsibility from all who hold authority.

Motaharnia: By governments, do you mean the executive?

PourEzzat: I mean the whole state—the government as an institution.

He continues by comparing with the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), whose humility in apologizing to the people before his death set the highest example. Similarly, leaders worldwide who apologize to their citizens strengthen their legitimacy.

Motaharnia: Even in Japan, we see ministers bowing for long minutes to apologize over minor issues.

PourEzzat: Exactly. Apologies bring dignity to governance.

The discussion then turns to accountability, evaluation, and how citizens and institutions must judge officials based on performance—not just slogans. Governance requires systems that hold leaders responsible, both inside and outside institutions like universities.

Motaharnia: Who says it should be otherwise?

PourEzzat: The point is, if someone can influence you and dictate how you should behave, then you must also have the reciprocal right to monitor and control their behavior.

Motaharnia: How can we control it?

PourEzzat: You must increase your own flexibility and capacity, and become more empowered.

The Role of National Development in Strengthening Power

Motaharnia: You mean increasing power? Power grows through national development, not slogans.

PourEzzat: Definitely through development. You know I agree with that.

Motaharnia: Do you agree that national development depends on context? Is it built upon concentration of power in the Islamic Republic, or upon pluralism and accountability?

PourEzzat: The structure is complicated. In the Constitution you see repeated elections—but it is even more complex than just elections.

Motaharnia: You see repeated presidential elections, but in the end, because of the hard core of power, they don’t fulfill their promises.

PourEzzat: I don’t agree. Once they get the vote…

Motaharnia: When they say, “They won’t let us,” then they are not accountable. Take Mr. Raisi—he just left. If he were alive now, the 2025 election would be ahead, and he should still be accountable for those three years, which are now being glossed over. So give me a clear answer: Is the Islamic Republic built on concentration of power, or on pluralism of power? And does future governance require distributing power across the ethical layers you speak of, or not?

PourEzzat: Let me ask you: If we want to reach a rational state where national interests and people’s freedoms are fully secured, how much independence of awareness must we institutionalize? My definition of transcendent governance was this: some people—like the Khawarij—make bizarre claims about transcendent governance. But transcendent governance, a term I coined in 2011, has four features that cannot be refuted. If people do not vote with awareness, then it isn’t truly their vote. Independence in voting means that if someone votes out of fear, despair, or poverty—or because of cheap slogans like a “50,000 toman” promise—that is not a real vote.

Motaharnia: But only system-approved candidates are allowed to run. Why do we keep blaming the people?

PourEzzat: I did not blame the people.

Motaharnia: Yet you say, if they lack awareness, they sell their vote for 50,000 tomans.

PourEzzat: Someone must judge. Independence in people’s choices requires independence in voting. People must have access to information. They must be serious about elections. We should not allow some to turn elections into a joke. Whenever people realize they made a mistake, they must have the right to revise their decision. These four features define transcendent governance—they restrict governments, not the people. These are requirements for rulers, not citizens. In Nahj al-Balagha, people are called “the pillar of religion.” If you remove the people, the tent of religion collapses. That shows their importance.

Motaharnia: The Doctor is right. People must vote knowingly, and elections must be continuous. Preparing the ground for such awareness lies within governance itself. But my question remains: Is Iran’s governance system centralized or not? If centralized, how can we ensure that pluralism of the people is accepted?

PourEzzat: Do you want me to answer scientifically or rhetorically?

Motaharnia: That’s not an answer to my question.

PourEzzat: Then I must check: did provincial governors have real maneuvering power, or were they strictly bound to obey the orders of higher authorities? When you came to get votes, you knew the parameters of the governance equation. You knew which domains you could not touch—the army, security—you knew these could not be negotiated.

Motaharnia: Did you vote in 2024?

PourEzzat: Yes. I won’t say for whom—that’s my right.

Motaharnia: But you still voted, even though you knew the president could do nothing. Why did you vote?

PourEzzat: I trusted his slogans.

Motaharnia: Since 2017, I’ve stopped voting. I tested it several times.

PourEzzat: Are the people at fault?

Motaharnia: No. But you say people must vote wisely. A wise person knows the president is only an executor and coordinator, nothing more.

PourEzzat: Still, we must respect the people.

Motaharnia: I do respect them. But the president is called the “second person” of the country.

PourEzzat: The one I voted for didn’t win. I respected the choice of the people.

Motaharnia: Yet you say people must vote knowingly and independently.

PourEzzat: Then think of the parties’ slogans.

Motaharnia: That sounds like saying, “You are free, but you must obey me.” In other words: you are free to vote or not, but you must vote.

PourEzzat: If there are three people among the public, can I not speak? The system imposes its authority. If you don’t know and still ask people for votes, you are a fraud. If you promised more than you could deliver, you committed deceit. Whether left or right, if you win, you must honor your slogans. If you later say, “They didn’t let me,” perhaps the first government could claim that. But not the second one—it already knows the parameters.

Motaharnia: You mean the executive branch?

PourEzzat: Whether the executive or parliament, it applies. The first parliament could perhaps claim ignorance. But the second should study whether promises could really be delivered. If they say “they didn’t let us,” then let them join the opposition.

Motaharnia: Then why run as candidates? Have you ever run?

PourEzzat: Once, yes.

Motaharnia: I refused. They pressured me, but I said no, because I knew I could do nothing.

PourEzzat: I thought I could be the people’s voice. That’s why I accepted.

Motaharnia: Even if pressured, when I know I can’t even influence policymaking, I cannot accept. You know, in academia, policymaking discourse isn’t even properly understood.

PourEzzat: That’s true. Even among us, many who teach “policy” don’t really understand it. Yet we still teach it across the country. In my scientific will, which some interpret differently, I’ve outlined a “governance testament” with many conceptual cells. If we can fill them, we could finally grasp policymaking properly. We must understand policy research, policy evaluation, policy measurement.

My point is: I tested it once, ran as a candidate, and lost. I respected those who won. Then I realized how much wealth it takes to succeed. I refused to enter electoral lists because I could not mentally align with either left or right. I stayed independent. Sometimes my name was put on lists without my knowledge or permission.

Fundamental Reforms in the Administrative System

Motaharnia: If tomorrow the Iranian administrative system were in your hands, what three fundamental reforms would you implement?

PourEzzat: I hope Dr. Rafieizadeh hears me. My first reform would be this: alongside establishing a precise performance evaluation system, I would abolish lifelong employment. That way, whoever remains in office must always be accountable. In major universities, staff are hired temporarily. But here, people who were decent choices at first end up staying 29 more years, making mistakes, yet still remain in their positions.

Motaharnia: One person with an average GPA of 12.5 wants to become a university professor — when they try to reject him they say he was political.

PourEzzat: You know, very often even the government has been questioned wrongly by politicians and political operatives who accused the responsible people unjustly in some cases and justly in others — even that swindling person sometimes rightly said that we must have a system that can distinguish truth from falsehood. Therefore, evaluation propositions must be precise. The appointment system must be bound to observe the laws.

Second, it goes back to those who are elected — those who take votes from you and me and the people. I would make their commitments measurable, and basically I would not allow anyone who gives unmeasurable slogans to be qualified for representation. Anyone who stands before the people and makes promises must state the mechanism for measuring them and draw his own success and failure line. They say the marksman was a cheat; he said I never miss — he shoots and then says, “I wanted to hit right here.” Many of our elected people are chosen, but when they reach positions they say, “We were successful.”

The third thing I would do so that the first and second are properly implemented is to establish a governance court, so that at the end of each term some rulers would receive a medal of honor that they were servants of the people, and others would receive a medal of deceit. You apparently are an artist in your art — you give some a Crystal Simorgh.

Conclusion and framework of transcendent governance

Motaharnia: We don’t give (them).

PourEzzat: Some receive awards indicating the disgracefulness of their performance; some rulers deserve praise, some deserve reflection, some deserve humiliation and removal. Amir al-Mu'minin says: mark the brow of the slanderer with shame when he is at fault and disgrace him among the people. One cannot constantly imagine that one will always accuse God — that determinism is a very base claim — or constantly accuse the enemy. If you keep accusing the enemy, your monotheistic faith is called into question. Can we accept that God, who is the source of revelation of His names, would constantly let us be dragged into the clutches of Satan?

Motaharnia: I agree with these three points and support them. The second point he made is interesting: they have errors and mistakes and yet they consider themselves entitled to success and victory and say we prevailed; whatever happens, they ultimately claim victory and then refuse to be accountable. He speaks of trial; we need accountability, but accountability does not exist. The power delegated by the people is not accountable.

PourEzzat: What I said was an honest attempt, and Dr. Motaharnia’s kindness toward me does not mean he prefers my view — he has his own independent opinion and generously pays attention to mine if he wishes. I believe that any idea that has a logical framework and can prove itself before the social judgments of reformers who want to steer the country toward balance should be considered. I hope your movement is toward national interest, not partisan interest. I hope you take both supporters and opponents into account. Regarding the costly measures you mentioned, consider the reality that in some cases there is no alternative to strengthening the country’s defenses so strongly that no one can claim the country. Try to avoid dictatorship.

Full interview of Mehdi Motaharnia with Dr. Ali-Asghar Pour-Ezzat