Simorgh | Intellectualism, Power, and the Deadlock of Republic in Iran – Conversation between Mehdi Motaharnia and Sadegh Zibakalam

Record of participation and reformism

Motaharnia: We intend to talk with Sadegh Zibakalam about the narrative of intellectualism, power, and the dead end of republicanism in Iran today and tomorrow.

Society must learn that we can, despite differences and distinctions, talk with each other about important matters. You have repeatedly defended voting, participation, and dialogue with the system. Today a large part of society is disillusioned with this approach. Do you remember—during Mr. Rouhani’s era and even Mr. Pezeshkian’s era—I'm asking you frankly, was your approach correct? Or did you not make a mistake? What are the reasons? How do you interpret and justify it?

Zibakalam: For several years now many people have made it their trade and profession to say that this regime has reached the end of the road and there is no hope. They call for reform, change, and in various forms call for overthrowing the regime — sit-down-and-please, stay-put and overthrow — some express it more plainly, like Mr. Mehdi Nasiri; others say it more tentatively. Some, like Dr. Mehrayin or Hatem Ghaderi or Tajzadeh, speak more openly; some, like Mehdi Motaharnia, ride that wave but are careful not to fall — not to fall so that people like Sadegh Zibakalam spit and curse at him, and not to fall so that the prosecutor summons him: neither the skewer burns nor the kebab is cooked. Tajzadeh, Mehrayin, Ghaderi, Iran International, Shahzadeh Reza Pahlavi raise the issue of overthrow; one person named Sadegh Zibakalam who does not raise overthrow is showered with anger, hatred and rancor — words like “mercenary,” “middle-player,” “continuist,” “’57-ite,” “safety valve,” etc., are hurled at me for not calling for overthrow.

Fine — call me traitor, mercenary, servant-in-subservience and whatever else you assign to me — it’s all correct — but may I ask you: you who, aside from overthrow, beat down anyone who says anything else with a cudgel — in the past few years what have you done besides sitting in New York and Paris and Tehran waiting for something to happen in Iran, for example for drivers to strike so you can say this is the starting point? That is, if someone listens to you and takes your words seriously, they imagine that on Tuesday it’s over and the Islamic Republic will not exist — this is their business and trade. Now since SH 1396, 1397 (2017–18, 2018–19) this program has started: whoever does not call for overthrow gets stoned.

Necessity of broad-mindedness and increasing wisdom

Motaharnia: You mentioned me. I am not an activist or political operative; I never join different parties. They tell me the same things. We must act with broad-mindedness to increase wisdom. The reality is we say the reform movement began in the mid‑1990s (mid‑1370s SH, around 1996). Did reforms begin based on a conscious will or because Mohammad Khatami won the vote by chance? We have observed the years 2001 (1380 SH), 2005 (1384 SH), 2009 (1388 SH), 2013 (1392 SH), 2017 (1396 SH), 2019 (1398 SH), and 2022 (1401 SH). The country’s economy is ruined; social problems such as divorce and addiction are catastrophic.

Zibakalam: There is a water and electricity crisis, addiction, etc. The problem starts precisely here: when Sadegh Zibakalam says he is not in favor of overthrow, before the sentence is even finished they pour on me and call me mercenary, pressure‑valve, servile, blind — they say I did not see Mahsa Amini, I did not see the November 2019 killings, as if I am claiming Switzerland and roses here. When have I ever said there are no problems? If you list the Islamic Republic’s problems I will add to that list.

Motaharnia: I am neither a royalist nor a godly‑party zealot. I respect Mustafa Mehrayin, Hatem Ghaderi, you. What should be done? You have been a critic your whole life; you started those critiques earlier than these gentlemen. Are you in doubt? Can the matter be solved through reforms?

Zibakalam: A verse says: “When I renounced every heart I bound to, repentance; wherever I sat in your remembrance, repentance; in longing for you I broke repentance a hundred times, from that repentance which I broke a hundred times, repentance.” When I say I do not agree with overthrow, the first artillery fired at me says I claim the regime is excellent — you are blind; you do not see the problems and misery. The next salvo says you are a government‑aligned reformist. From 1997 (1376 SH) until today — 3 June 2025 (13 Khordad 1404 SH) — what post or position have I held that makes them call me a government reformist? The next wave shot at me is: which reforms? Aren’t you ashamed to talk about reforms? In this system reforms can be done. I have only said once that I do not support overthrow — and various waves have been fired at me for that. I can ask the men and women who call for overthrow: have I gone mute and retracted my words? I too could call for overthrow like you, except I do not say it because the prosecutor would open a new case against me. One tribal wound is enough. I too use classy phrases like “transition from the system.” Can you tell me, you who passed beyond the system and want to topple it — from late 2017 (end of 1396 SH) until now what have you done to bring the system closer to collapse so that I will join you and push that bulldozer you are pushing?

Motaharnia: In September 1941 (Shahrivar 1320 SH) Reza Khan — whom you have often praised — Ayatollah Khomeini wrote his first statement; from 1941 to 1979 (1320–1357 SH) how many years passed until Sadegh Zibakalam, with his record, stood alongside the revolutionaries? The interim government came; Sadegh Zibakalam, who is my colleague and indirect teacher. The process that began was only triggered in 2017 (1396 SH). I am not an overthrower or a political activist either. I founded a think tank to ask what should be done. You told me futurism within the Islamic Republic is laughable. We know it is difficult, but hard work must be done for the nation. One pain is enough. The issue is whether today some act cautiously, or boldly are dependent, or have an intellectual tactic. I design strategy; I left the narrow circle of political science and moved to interdisciplinary futures studies. Tactics must be designed. I perceive from Sadegh Zibakalam and other friends that we must analyze how Iran’s future will be. Whatever system rules us should not matter; what matters is the kind of governance that must be formed inside or replacing this system. We can ask Mustafa Tajzadeh, Mehrayin and others you named: what is the alternative? That is why in 2002 (1381 SH) I said pressure from below and bargaining from above does not work — culture building and civic education must happen at the base and public consultation from above.

Zibakalam: I believe overthrow has not been a political goal arrived at by some people inside and outside the country who sat together, studied, and concluded that there is no option but toppling the Islamic Republic and everything else is a waste of time. Overthrow has not resulted that way. So how did overthrow arise? From my view, overthrow is the effect of hatred and rancor toward the Islamic Republic.

Motaharnia: It is negative not constructive.

Zibakalam: That means individuals, figures and personalities looked at the people and saw how much hatred and rancor they harbor toward the system — like a wave and flood that swept everything away. Now no one dares not to say “overthrow” because if someone does not call for it they will be cursed and damned.

Motaharnia: Do you accept that the general public is like that?

Zibakalam: I do not accept that the general public is like that. What I accept is that a significant percentage of Iranians are dissatisfied with the system — I believe at least 60% are dissatisfied. Because they refused to participate in elections: in the last election held in Tir last year (Tir 1403 SH / June–July 2024) at least 60% did not participate. Can we say those 60% were certainly dissatisfied with the system? I say yes: these 60% not only were dissatisfied but believed voting was pointless — that the system had no alternative except being overthrown; therefore they abstained. Does the 40% who participated in that June election mean they are satisfied with the system? No. Many — including Sadegh Zibakalam — participated even though hopelessly. I think we arrive at about 60–70% of people reaching the point of saying the system must be overthrown; 20–30% do not vote for overthrow.

Motaharnia: And some support it.

Zibakalam: A lot of them support it. Suppose ten percent do not support it — another twenty percent support it out of fear, belief, or a sacred Islamic outlook. Some of my relatives hold bachelor’s degrees but believe this regime is an Islamic system. Their view may seem strange to you and me: how can an educated person with a BA think that the Islamic Republic is an Islamic, religious system?

Motaharnia: It is a real fact.

Zibakalam: Twenty percent of 85 million becomes about 20 million. In the Islamic Republic there are at least 20 million people who, for various reasons, stand by this regime. Twenty to thirty percent, conversely, are prepared with tooth and claw to tear this regime down. In January 2018 I was teaching a class at the University of Tehran; for the first time some female students took off their headscarves and walked around the campus. The Basij came. The anger I saw in the Basijis’ eyes — if some of them had been armed, they might have shot those unveiled girls. The anger I saw in those girls — if they had been armed, they might have shot the Basijis. When you want to gain popularity, avoid insults, and increase your followers, you use “overthrow.” Remember what you are saying: you are speaking about a society in which 20 percent are willing to shed blood to keep this regime, and 20–30 percent are willing to shed blood to destroy it.

Zibakalam: They tell me that I scare people with civil war, Afghanistan-like chaos, or Syria-like outcomes. This is a great Iranian-Islamic civilization, and yet I see the anger, resentment, hatred, and hostility.

Motaharnia: I do not claim to judge; I evaluate and assess with the models I know. There are courses on theories of revolution that teach social transformations after political sociology in political science faculties. I am a humble student of these faculties and also teach. The common denominator of all revolutionary theories from before Socrates until now rests on three points:

Public dissatisfaction becomes actionable when popular opinion reaches a compression point where tolerating the situation is impossible. One can criticize for years, be upset, but when it reaches this point, the first part is complete.

Hope and success rely on leadership and organization — as you mentioned. From Zibakalam’s words, it is understood that he tries, not out of caution, dependency, or intellectual tactics, but out of concern for the people so that they do not confront each other; he seeks to balance this situation.

Zibakalam: That is one reason.

Motaharnia: I accept this reason knowing you and your family. Considering macro trends today, as we examine things scientifically, can we stop this current, or should we think of a new plan for Iran’s future? Does reformism, in the model you describe, as some say, simply politically legitimize the current system and prevent the country from moving toward a better future? Can we stop this? Can we design a model to answer? Control the anger of both factions, and bring the 45% gray zone into play to solve this problem according to your model?

Zibakalam: The fact that dissatisfaction, resentment, and hatred toward the Islamic Republic have increased in recent years does not mean I, Sadegh Zibakalam, should surrender to this wave of resentment, hatred, and anger and say that overthrow is the only solution. Anyone advocating overthrow is not necessarily a traitor or agent. Many who talk about overthrow do not know Iranian society, which is full of grudges, conflicts, hardships. They simply ride the wave.

Today, mid-June 2025, society is influenced by four deep social divides. Anyone unaware of these four divides cannot find a solution.

Motaharnia: Name the four divides.

Zibakalam:

Historical-Ethnic Divide: In 1979, when the revolution happened, there was a security issue with the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. I, as a representative of the interim government, went to mediate between the Kurds. Some Azerbaijani nationalists also tried to mobilize, but the revolution’s momentum and Khomeini’s authority prevented it. Today, if the system falls, it is not just Kurdistan, Mahabad, Sardasht, Piranshahr, and Bukan — Azerbaijani, Arab, and Sunni groups like Mawlawi Abdulhamid’s are added, with even more resentment than in 1979.

Economic Divide: Some drive expensive cars while others search garbage bins for food.

Cultural Divide: Middle-class girls removed their headscarves; Basijis are also middle-class yet full of resentment. During northern Nowruz, affluent residents laughed at my fasting and the housekeeper’s. The cultural divide has grown tremendously.

Ethnic and Fiscal Divide: These divides have deepened over 46 years due to unwise policies. In 1979, financial and cultural divides existed but were not like today — people wore different clothes but did not hate each other. Now, hatred is openly expressed.

Motaharnia: This is very important.

Zibakalam: Yes. All of this is the result of 45–46 years. Overthrow advocates say the system must go because it cannot be fixed. I am neither an overthrow advocate nor a defender; I want to remain neutral. Public dissatisfaction exists — what should we do?

Even in 1974–75, when people wrote to the late Shah, he ignored them. People neither wanted to return to the past nor could they; they feared the future. In 1979, fear erupted, and they accepted whatever happened. Now, I believe there is a way out of this “present obsession” due to lost trust and credibility.

Motaharnia: What should we do?

Zibakalam: Suppose this regime falls tonight and tomorrow a new government declares monarchy, republic, or even an Islamic system without velayat-e faqih. Then the real backlash begins. We would have jumped out of the frying pan into the fire — the situation worsens because the divides would surface.

The Kurdish issue, unacknowledged in 1979, would explode. I was the interim government’s representative in 1979 and went from Urmia to Mahabad to reconcile Kurds and Turks — not knowing armed forces were in between. Now, if the system collapses, it would be worse.

I believe gradual change and transformation are the only alternatives. Whenever I raise this, people say we do not have the time of Noah — 46 years of youth wasted. I say historical issues are not like that. Beyond democracy and moving toward democracy, there is no solution. The divides I mentioned can only be solved through democracy. Ethnic divides, like the Kurdish issue, can only be addressed through democracy.

الديمقراطية كأسلوب حياة

مطهرنيا: دمقرطة المجتمع الوطني تعني استخدام الديمقراطية كأسلوب حياة. يجب أن تكون حياة صادق زيبا كلام داخل أسرته ديمقراطية، وقد حاول أن يجعلها كذلك. يجب أن نحول الديمقراطية إلى أسلوب حياة في مجتمعنا الوطني، ونجعلها جزءًا من حياتنا اليومية. ما هو التشكيل الحكومي الحالي، وما سيكون في المستقبل؟ إذا صوت غالبية الناس للحفاظ على الوضع القائم — وهو ما لا يفعلون — 20٪ يدعمونه لأسباب مختلفة كما ذكر زيبا كلام. لكن جزءًا يقف بحزم، أكثر من الذين يريدون فقط الحفاظ على الأمور. القطبان في السلطة — حماة الوضع القائم والمستاؤون منه — يتصارعون، وهنا تبدأ الاضطرابات.

إذا قبلنا أن تصويت الشعب حق، وأن نحصل على الأصوات في نظام انتخابي عادل، فالديمقراطية تعني قبول المسؤولية والمساءلة تجاه السلطة التي أوكلت إليك. أصوات الناس تحدد المسؤولين. أقول إن تصويت الناس أحيانًا صحيح وأحيانًا ليس كذلك. حتى لو كان التصويت يخالف آرائي 100٪، ولكن تم الحصول عليه في مجتمع انتخابي سليم، قد لا أقبله لأسباب معينة، ومع ذلك أقف بجانب الأغلبية. كما أسعى لتغيير الأغلبية من خلال أسلوب حياة ديمقراطي حتى يختاروا بشكل أفضل في الانتخابات القادمة. أول شيء يجب أن نراه لمستقبل إيران هو أن تتحول الديمقراطية إلى أسلوب حياة.

في مكعب الانهيار، كتبت أنه بحلول 2017 (1396) وصلوا إلى التحرر من “هوس الحاضر”. الحقيقة هي أن الاستياء الواسع والانتقال إلى ما بعد الإصلاح موجود. لماذا يوجد تجاوز للإصلاح؟ هل كان جميع الإصلاحيين جزءًا من الحكومة؟ هل كانوا خونة؟ هل كانوا جميعًا مثل زيبا كلام؟ ماذا حدث؟ اليوم، يجب علينا رسم المستقبل بشكل صحيح وكسر الدورة الشريرة لتكرار التاريخ حتى لا تتفاقم النتائج السيئة.

هو يعتقد أنه يجب التعايش مع النظام الحالي لجلب النظام تدريجيًا إلى الفوضى التي أبرزها مرارًا. هذه مسألة قلق جاد بالنسبة لصادق زيبا كلام. هل يمكننا بناء الحوكمة المستقبلية على أساس التعايش مع الهيكل الحالي؟ اليوم، يُطرح أيضًا الحديث عن “القيادة الثالثة”. الجمهورية في إيران تواجه نوعًا من الأزمة. هل الجمهور مشترك في هذا الأمر؟ قال زيبا كلام إن ما لا يقل عن 60٪ من الناس غير راضين ويقفون في ذلك الجانب. بين الـ 40٪ المتبقية، بعضهم مثله، رغم أنهم ليسوا نشطين، يعرفون العديد من القضايا والمشاكل والأزمات الكبرى. إذا قمت بإدراج 30 مشكلة، يمكنه إضافة 30 أخرى. هذا يعكس ما يسعى إليه في التخطيط المستقبلي وإعادة الهندسة.

الجيل الشاب: توقع حياة عادية والتحرر من هوس الحاضر

بالنسبة للجيل الشاب، هناك تغييرات صعبة ومخاطر مستقبلية. في 1979، اعترف زيبا كلام ببعض الأخطاء؛ ذكر أنه ذهب إلى مدن معينة دون إدراك وجود كوملة أو الحزب الديمقراطي ولم يتمكن من الوساطة هناك.

اليوم، يرى البعض صادق زيبا كلام كممثل للإصلاحية عديمة الفاعلية. ما هو الرد؟ ماذا يجب أن نقول لهذا الجيل؟

زيبا كلام: يسألني الكثير عن الجيل الجديد وما بعد الستينيات: بشكل محترم، لماذا قمتم بالثورة؟ وبشكل غير محترم، يقولون: “في ’57، أفسدت الأجيال القادمة.” لقد اعتدت على ذلك — إذا لم يسبوني، يبدو الأمر غريبًا. على سبيل المثال، قبل أيام، قال السيد بن سلمان إن الجيش السعودي أقوى من الجيش الإيراني. نشرت وكتبت: “عزيزي ولي العهد بن سلمان، حتى لو كان الجيش قويًا جدًا، كان لمحمد رضا شاه الجيش الرابع أو الخامس عالميًا، ولكن كان هناك أيضًا 6,000 سجين سياسي.” ببساطة، لا أحتاج إلى أصوات؛ لا أريد أن أصبح رئيسًا أو نائبًا. لا أحتاج إلى تصويتكم لأقول لهؤلاء الشباب المؤمنين…

أقول، حتى تقرأوا على الأقل صفحتين من تاريخ 1979، انظروا إلينا بالاستياء والكراهية. حسنًا، اكرهونا حتى نهاية العالم. لم تقرأوا حتى صفحتين عن سبب سقوط نظام قوي، ولا حتى سطرين عما حدث بعد 1979 حتى الآن. لدى الجيل الشاب وجهة نظر: كانت إيران تتقدم، وقد دفعها محمد رضا شاه كصاروخ كروز. ومع ذلك، بعض الخونة والحاقدين أسقطوا النظام من أجل الكهرباء والمياه المجانية، وجلبوا رجال الدين، بمساعدة البريطانيين. إلى متى ستتعاملون مع هذا؟ هذا هو الترياق.

إذا كنتم راضين عن هذا الكم من الغضب والحقد والكراهية تجاه الجيل الماضي،
 

Motaharnia: You know I have read two pages of the book on the 1979 revolution; I am not an expert, but I understand its cultural and value-oriented approach, the mismatch with economic and political development, and the mobilization of resources focused on politics. The young generation has both long-term and short-term memory from a cognitive science perspective. The late Motahari was imprisoned in Evin and returned to teach in class. This young generation has a broad, functional memory. They say that at that time, there was progress—perhaps not full development—but progress had been made in some aspects. Compared to the Gulf Arab microstates like the UAE, Qatar, and Oman, which now flaunt themselves, could they have spoken this way under the late Shah? How did they advance so much in 45 years? I do not say they are developed. Today’s youth, with a high unemployment rate, aged roughly 15 to 30, lack skills and jobs. Who created these conditions? Can we solve these problems? The fear today is that 55% confront each other with mutual hatred. Is it not possible that this 55% may increase by 10% in six months?

Zibakalam: I am someone who, with every fiber of my being, believes in liberalism. I have said many times that every cell in my body is liberal. I am so liberal that just look at my daughter—I never interfere in her matters. One of my biggest disagreements with my wife is that I act as if nothing matters; if someone asks me something, I answer if my mind allows. I do not say you must study or read books. To those who ask why we revolted in ’57, who had no bread or water, I say: nothing is solved through hatred and resentment. The 6,000 political prisoners, 80–90% were the most educated sectors of Iranian society—students, writers, lawyers, etc.—did they revolt for free water and electricity? When I see their blood being shed and their eyes tearing me apart asking why we revolted in ’57, I say: study, but I do not issue blanket judgments.

In the previous discussion, I mentioned several major societal gaps. There are also smaller, secondary gaps, which may be even more terrifying. In 1991 (1370), after completing my studies in England, returning to the Faculty of Law and Political Science in Tehran, if a political science student studied well and read books, other students respected him. Perhaps you would not believe it: if a student is rarely found like this, they would say he is a diligent provincial student.

The Role of Elites, Universities, and Knowledge Production

Motaharnia: From 1987 to 1991 (1366–1370), I was at Tehran University, the same years Dr. Zibakalam returned, and Dr. Allah-Kolayi also returned. I took my final course on Soviet Governance with him. In 1989 (1368), I wrote The Power of Human Governance with a preface by His Excellency Bashiriyeh. He recognized it as a textbook at Tehran University. I never cared about grades, but I am proud Bashiriyeh wrote it. The Faculty was at its peak. Where is it now? The reality is that we are facing this generation today; this situation is the product and fruit of this very revolution. Why do you want to guard this revolution? You have seen its prisons, the 6,000 prisoners. The point is that political elites, intellectuals, and dynamic thinkers must face the question: what do the rulers in this context have in store to be accountable? We do not want overthrow. You pressure us. I say, from a future-oriented perspective, what plans and strategies do you have to solve these crises, mega-crises, and disasters? The new generation has experienced negotiations since 2001 (1380). What should I do?

Zibakalam: I have reached a state where I find that, no matter how much I search, I cannot find others like me. I see others are rational and are not placed in positions of scorn. I do not say we must cling to this system and that the 1979 revolution was complete. True, I oppose overthrow, but I do not stand simply to say I opposed overthrow. I am wholeheartedly seeking change, but I call it “change,” and my intention is not regime change or overthrow. I refer to changes that this system will undoubtedly make and is forced to make. Who would have believed that hijab would change this way? After 2022 (1401), hijab will not return to pre-2022. I believe we must compel the system to make other changes. The question is: how can we compel this system to change? How can we force it to retreat? My point is, instead of thinking about how to make this system retreat and change so that the political and social situation improves, the moment someone says we must create changes in the system, they are labeled compromise-seekers, and we are told: “this system must stay.” This is what has been imposed on us.

Motaharnia: Forcing the ruling political system to act comes with extremely high costs, which practically equates to the concept of overthrow.

Zibakalam: Absolutely not. I have always believed that overthrow is never the solution.

Motaharnia: I oppose overthrow.

Zibakalam: I have participated in elections many times. Of course, I did not participate in the 2021 (1400) presidential election because the country’s situation was such that there was no ray of hope. I also did not participate in the 2019 (1398) parliamentary elections, and in the 2023 (1402) parliamentary elections I did not participate either.

My response to those who accuse me of “participating in elections means joining hands with the system” is this: Very well, if we heroically boycotted the 2024 (1403) elections, the outcome would have been Dr. Saeed Jalili becoming our country’s president. From February 11, 1979 (22 Bahman 57) until today, I spent seven years in England for my doctorate, but during the remaining years I was present in Iran. The worst years I experienced politically and socially were nearly three years when the late Mr. Raisi was president. I, and many others, faced “purification” at the University of Tehran. I believed that in the 2024 (1403) elections, in any way possible, we should not allow Saeed Jalili to become president.

Motaharnia: The same “purification” at the university affected me as well. I say my issue with the university, its managers, and heads is one thing, and the issue of Iran’s future is another. Your remarks are correct from your perspective and angle of view. I say, if Mr. Jalili had become president, from one perspective it would have benefited the Islamic Republic system and its continuity, because there was still hope that someone like Pezeshkian could solve the issue in the way Pezeshkian did, though now he cannot solve it. Pezeshkian says he agrees with negotiation, but when the leadership says no, he also opposes, yet negotiations were taking place. If Mr. Tajzadeh comes, can he really be effective?

Zibakalam: Yes.

Motaharnia: In the first stage, do you see this will in this ruling body?

Zibakalam: That’s another discussion.

Motaharnia: That’s the prerequisite. If this will does not exist, it’s a hypothesis that cannot be proven and internally, as Fukuyama says, it is a discursive action; by saying it, its results are born. You can accept that now Mr. X is allowed by Zibakalam—anyone with these characteristics, will it actually work unless forced?

Zibakalam: Some of my relatives in 2009 (1388) during the peak of the story, where one side was Ahmadinejad and hardline conservatives, and the other side was Mir-Hossein Mousavi and the reformist backing, in complete astonishment, said we must vote for Ahmadinejad. They were doctors, nurses, and lawyers.

Motaharnia: What was their reason?

Zibakalam: Their reason was that, based on Ahmadinejad’s 4-year record, if he remained president for a few more years, the system would rapidly fall into a pit. However, what happened? Mir-Hossein Mousavi did not win, and Ahmadinejad did.

Motaharnia: Could Mir-Hossein Mousavi have worked?

Zibakalam: Ahmadinejad came, and regarding his differences with the leadership, we had none. But Ahmadinejad continued the same policies from 2009 to 2013 (1388–1392). The system did not collapse; the only outcome was that we became worse off. The same story happened in 2021 (1400): we did not participate in the elections, Mr. Raisi was elected, and became president. We did not participate—did the system fall? No. Nothing happened; we were still subjected to “purification.” In those three years, how much did we regress?

Motaharnia: They themselves consider it the best period.

Zibakalam: Let them know. Why did I want with all my heart to prevent Mr. Saeed Jalili? Because it was the continuation of the same misery that Mr. Raisi had started at that time. Now I hear Dr. So-and-So has become the governor of Gilan, so-and-so has become a deputy minister. These are competent people helping improve the country. It is a wrong thinking that if Pezeshkian doesn’t come, someone will come and accelerate the system’s collapse. The system will not collapse—we become worse off. Many do not agree with me and say, let Raisi, Saeed Jalili, and Ahmadinejad become president so the system collapses faster.

I believe it matters whether the president is Ayatollah Jannati, Khatami, Rafsanjani, or Ahmadinejad. Who claims it makes no difference? Yes, the leadership has supra-human and divine power, I accept that. But concluding that the president is insignificant is wrong. Khatami himself said, “I am a water boy; all decisions are made by the leadership.” That’s not true. It does make a difference who the president is.

Motaharnia: Zibakalam says changes should occur gradually within the existing history of the Islamic Republic due to fear of confrontation between people in the two extremes: supporters and overthrowers. Another point Zibakalam raises is that instead of this path, some people gave a negative vote through participation in elections without believing in it; some people in universities, when voting, did not truly believe in anyone but acted based on circumstances. These are issues that cannot be ignored in our lived experience. But there is a young segment that says, “I don’t want to waste my youth waiting or giving a negative vote.”

Zibakalam: They tell me we don’t have Noah’s lifespan; we cannot live for decades like turtles. They are completely right. But I say, my son, my daughter, if you complain, I say: When you go home tonight, take a map of Iran and its neighbors. See where you were born. Are your neighbors Norway, Denmark, France, Germany? No—they are Taliban, Iraq, bin Salman, Ilham Aliyev. You were born here.

Motaharnia: He says yes, I was born here; he has no revolutionary ideals, wants a normal life, wants benefits, work, security, comfort. He compares his life to the UAE and Saudi Arabia 50 years ago; he aligns himself with his past 50 years. Didn’t you compare Islam of that time with the Islam of the Prophet’s era and say it wasn’t true Islam or Shiism? In 1978 (1357), revolutionary Shi’a Islam emerged. Now we compare it with 50 years ago when there were 6,000 political prisoners. They say, “We want a normal, calm life. When we wake up, our news should be developmental.” Political elites become responsible for today’s society’s failures. We cannot wait; if you tell him to wait and he cannot, he surpasses you. When he surpasses, some who want to ride this wave will take advantage, and enemies outside exist: religious monarchists, Trumpists, Hezbollah supporters. While there is incapacity to transition to a new governance model in your system, if capability exists, what percentage can it achieve in the current situation?

Zibakalam: First, see where you were born. Second, look at your history and past. Son, you were born where governance is in the heavens, with divine order, successor of the hidden Imam. You were not born in Switzerland, Denmark, or France, where legitimacy comes from people’s votes. You must know where you were born. Then see how to move forward, which path to take to become like Denmark, Norway, France, Italy, Netherlands. Can the path suggested by friends to overthrow the system turn us into the Netherlands? Once, on February 11, 1979, the system was overthrown—did we become the Netherlands? So, overthrow it again—will we become the Netherlands? We have no choice. If you do not want to understand your past, at least investigate why the ideals of February 11, 1979, did not materialize. If you do not examine any of it and expect tomorrow to be paradise overnight, it is impossible to achieve a century’s journey in one night.

Motaharnia: Let’s admit, change does not happen in two days. Before the Constitutional Revolution, changes occurred; the revolutionary voice exploded outside Iran, reactions arose, society underwent transformations. The Pahlavis introduced modernization but failed to institutionalize it, causing a gap that led to their own downfall. Despite all these experiences, we are structured in a “legocentric” and discourse-driven pattern. Legocentric separates dar al-kufr and dar al-haqq, seeing everything in black and white, with no middle ground. When structural illness is this severe, the structure becomes confrontational. Instead of being based on what it is, I, Mahdi Motaharnia, son of Abbas, hold these views. You say you are liberal; I say I am a liberal democrat. This confrontational structure does not create change; agencies manage it for themselves. In this state, whatever emerges, the result is the same. You say we can make big changes—I say with this situation, big changes are impossible. You say it’s possible? A third leadership is upcoming; there is also a succession crisis. Like international replacement crises, my concern, Motaharnia, is: in this situation, according to Zibakalam’s broad thinking, what can we do?

Zibakalam: I do not accept your statements. The issue is much simpler. I believe it’s not at the level you suggest; lower it. Our society is backward. Many Iranians, supporters, and opponents, get upset. We have a backward society. The best books on Iran’s situation are written by foreigners. Some reputable international journals in sociology and history exist—search for the last 60 years: how many articles from Iranian humanities professors have been published in these journals? Zero. This shows backwardness.

Motaharnia: Even if they exist, they do not publish.

Zibakalam: One prominent aspect of backwardness in humanities, including history and sociopolitical developments, is the prevalence of conspiracy theories. Why are conspiracy theories prevalent in Iran? Not in Switzerland, India, Japan. Why do we see everything as a conspiracy? Well-educated and knowledgeable people mostly propagate these ideas.

In 2022 (1401), sometimes at the Faculty of “Women, Life, Freedom,” I was present; a political science student at the University of Tehran said, “Doctor, don’t be afraid, take to the streets; this time the masters want to leave.” Hossein Agha, the grocer, doesn’t say this. What you are saying is advanced. Our biggest problem is understanding our society’s transformations. We curse so much.

Motaharnia: I, Motaharnia, want to go into the deeper layers and ask: this rough layer you say has caused our backwardness—what exactly is it? In my second term, I wrote Power, Man, and Government, and His Excellency Besharieh slammed my book against the wall. In our own universities, did we allow the youth to say things that might even seem laughable, but for them to theorize themselves? Is the educational system still, as in the past—worse than before, as you say—so that our generation is not repeatable, that we’ve regressed? Has human capital changed? You say you are not an overthrower; I say I agree, I am not either. The point is: with the human capital we have now, and with those of us who studied in that era and have aged, how much capacity do we have? The human resources nurtured in the same universities where we were professors—and purified—what capability do they now have for major changes?

Zibakalam: Everything I say is for the generation aged 15 to 30. My dear ones, you cannot build the future with grudge, hatred, and enmity; only by understanding the past can we build. If we do not know how we arrived at Khordad 1404, we cannot construct the future. That’s all I mean.

Motaharnia: What are the three words that, in your view, shape Iran’s future?

Zibakalam: 1—Letting go of grudge, hatred, and enmity. 2—Understanding the past (knowing our society). 3—Understanding the world outside Iran (knowing advanced societies).

Motaharnia: Can Zibakalam transcend Zibakalam?

Zibakalam: If I see a reason to transcend, I will definitely do it. I have transcended many things already.

Motaharnia: Know that when we have a conversation with each other, we respect one another. Sitting in a gathering does not mean we fully accept everything the other person says. Our path is to create knowledge. If we do not generate knowledge, we will just repeat the same path we’ve taken before. The Zibakalams will remain the same Zibakalams, and those who come will not necessarily be better than us.

To build a better future for Iran, it is essential to create a knowledgeable society—a society that is not merely centered on rhetoric.

We are not political activists seeking to create a movement in this field, but we demand a knowledge-centered approach to solving existing issues. Anyone can benefit from it, and anyone who can do it better should do so. The point is: today, society faces crises, and some disasters seem unsolvable. We must find solutions. Within all factions and generations, the solution lies in togetherness. All Iranians must come together to build Iran’s future. We must learn alongside each other. A 21st-century human is someone who strives to learn from everything their mind perceives.

Full file of Abdi Media’s conversation with Sadegh Zibakalam.