The Right to Protest and Iran's Future Governance Model, Mehdi Motaharnia's Conversation with Hedayat Aghaei on the Simorgh Program

Classic or soft revolutions?

Motaharnia: We are going to talk about politics, governance, power technology, reform and future with the guidance of Allah Aghaei.  Politics of realism and the boundaries of reform are the point I want to pursue in the first part in the form of various questions.  How reformism is in the world where political order is redefined.  Can it be the speed or speed of the straw -oriented or transformative straw?  Can reformism be helpful?  We have to admit that some of the people in 2017 have passed through reformism.  The future of Iran and Iran will be affected by this component what do you think? 

Agai: The issue of reform and reformism has been raised for the last two or three decades.  When I was a student, the atmosphere of revolutionary and radicalism was at the same time as a term called revolution and revolution, would the reforms of the revolution become?  There has always been a question mark in the reformist method before and after the revolution and in the political history of the world, whether the reform method can make profound changes.  There may be no specific answer, maybe this question is not right.  Reforms and restoration of existing conditions have a mission had another mission in the past, but over time, due to the conditions that human beings have found in history, the two lines came together.  We see the revolutions that we have seen in the past, such as the Great French Revolution or the October Revolution or even the Islamic Revolution.

Motaharnia: Classic Revolutions 

Mr Mr: Classic revolutions have been found very little instead of developments moving to softer, even deeper and quietly, perspectives that sometimes change even in societies that look radical.  So we can say that the reformism and the reformist line became more bold, once a revolution to keep the achievements of that reform revolution.  It has become transformation, of course, there are still elements that try to keep the status quo perhaps less than 15 % of the collection, the statements that the Assembly of Engineers, the Cultural Association, the Cultural Association, the teachers, are mainly more radical, and they are still more likely to be transformed.  The system of system and in the current situation of reformism has moved towards transformation, and this transformation can be the basis for future social movements. 

Motaharnia: What did you read in the noble industry?

Mr Agai: I have studied metallurgical engineering in 1977 in the field of metallurgical engineering today.

Refreed, Roll, Olice - Which is real?

Motaharnia: In the reformist political literature, there is a roller, the oleation, the olestine sits in the space between the reform and the roller, the reformists are present in the structure of the government, they are in the structure of what is called the political literature of the state, and the defenders of the coup, such as the military and the coup.  The keeper of the status quo will continue to lose the future, so it needs reform.  To go to a desirable status, the status quo and the mechanisms and formulas do not respond, they must change this status, but these changes must be restricted and calculated from within the government, but the transformation of the government or the government does not mean State from the outside, and they want to be new to the community.  According to this meaning today you point out that reforms are sitting on the evolution and that this transformation is so close that we can say that it is close to the concept of revolution, why is this process achieved?  Many many see the reforms as the bureaucratic process that slows down the evolution, the continuums say that they are creating a space for the control of social forces to develop transformation, so the reformist boss repeats the people at the polls, which will lead to the same time as the past.  Because of their own existence in that reform structure, they have not yet accepted that they have been out of reformist and must accept another title, but what do you think in the same bureaucracy.

Mr Mr: Basically, those present in the revolutions have a common sense, and that they want to make changes regularly. When a revolution is politically concluded, the sovereignty does institutionalization for its own consolidation, and in terms of static and revolutionary thinking, there are differences and divergences.  Suppose I have revolutionized the government is divided into posts. Even the one who is a member of parliament, the minister, and so on, I do not know what the theme can do, it wants to be a transformation, inherently in the forces that revolutionized many revolutions.  During Cuba and Latin America, Czechwar was a militant, and formed the Czechus.  The root of reformism is originally from ???  The Islamic Revolution means that there are forces that do not have left or right, even in the spectrum known as today's right, their elements have come together, originating from that nature.  

Reformist Definition - Indicators

Motaharnia: What is the definition of this meaning?  What indicators do you give? 

Mr: Usually unhappy with the status quo, they have not reached their ideals, 

Reformist: frustrated or alive

Motaharnia: There are frustrations that are on political factions 

Aghaei: Somehow it can be interpreted, chanting, when I was a revolution, I was a second year of university slogans, we were chanting the independence of the Islamic Republic's release.

Motaharnia: It was unrealistic if it was 

Mr Mr: As soon as the Rex Cinema was very influential later, we found out that the regime was not the work of other elements, the idealistic servant when the revolution was formed.  Westerned as a thing. NO Western but Eastern

Motaharnia: Both Eastern and Western 

Mr: If that is the case, it will be balanced.  Discussion of the differences in economic classes, aristocracy and issues such as freedom.  Before the revolution I was arrested when I was registered for two weeks, I was sitting for a while, I was caught up for a registration, they said the semester and I couldn't go, and said I was waiting for a call and said, "I said," I said, "  They were also allowed to pay as much as the employee's salaries, and I finally registered. 

In the current situation of the reformist movement that has begun to this point, it has made identity changes, if it wants to reform the achievements of the revolution along the way, but to its goal, the despair has now prevailed to happen, which is our day's reformist title.  The reformists at the time, when I was at the time, most of those who were at the time said it should be done, but the context of the revolution is today that they are desperate to maintain the events of the revolution.  There are profound transformation in society.

Isn't it too late?  (Reading 1 to 2)

Motaharnia: It's not too late?  After the 88 % small and limited, the transformation approach was deeply understood, they refused to be nominated or if they knew they wanted to have their own negative impact, but part of the reformists remained, as they came to the post of 1403 elections after the election.  They came and failed to capture the majority, though we took the president and saw what the president was talking about, so it seems that the reconstruction of legitimacy institutions at least within the framework of reformism could have been necessary to respond until 1396.  The result of the highlight was determined whether it could be saved without the reconstruction of political legitimacy institutions or even mere transformation? 

Mr Agai: The most important factor in changing the identity and accelerating the reformists' move towards fundamental change is the motivation, from class distances, political issues, even freedoms as one of the thousands of people who judged both sides at the university.  You see, but the satellite is a crime, there are motivations that can give reformism to transformation and depth, these are the many factors that I think the reformists are clinging to the status quo.  The foundation of foreign policy in the way we govern the cultural issues of these events. Is it going from the seemingly armed street?  Or we are a cultural community of several thousand years of culture. We can dominate the discourse and intellectual dialogue that no dictatorship can confront.  Today the formation of public opinion is the biggest weapon that can take dictators and suppression.  Is evident in the story of a woman's life of freedom 

Motaharnia: It was obtained with a conversation

Mr Mr: It is true that there were injuries on the street, but it was public opinion. 

Motaharnia: The age of communications, the diminishing of national borders, etc. It was also an influential revolution. Although the revolution came to create more restrictions than the Pahlavi regime you mentioned you were your student career in the same professor who taught for 28 years and said that you should not be public or disqualified.  They didn't go back to work.  New or modern matching in society has begun completely and it has long been showing itself and tall we can't ignore the reality, but my problem is when reforms are involved in these restrictions, it must be out of reform, but it keeps one leg in the governmentIn other words, it uses social forces to put pressure on the political arena to take the posts, and when it takes the post, it cannot do what Said Hajjarian said pressure from the bottom of the bargaining from the top, the pressure from the bottom of the social forces was demanding a change in the support of the people.  The bargaining in the above and promoting the reforms to do it, which is still repeated, and they say we can use and make changes that, as you say, the costs of crossing street tunnels are not. You say this process has taken place — the achievements of this process, which began intentionally or unintentionally in 1997 (year 1376), and now we are in 2025 (solar Hijri year 1404) and you and I are talking — have the reformists learned an experience in this historical process that would lead them to try, based on that experience, to reach results again using their old methods? Will they be effective now if they continue? Reform turned into transformation. I myself said in 2011 (1390), two years after the 2009 events, that reformism is useless — every decade there must come a new outlook, a new discourse must be awakened. Instead of pressure from below, bargaining from above; we should have cultivated culture at the grassroots and created the agenda-setting from above — not in the name of self-styled bigwigs — and we should have questioned both elite classes and intellectuals: those who maintain the status quo and those who seek reformist change by certain methods — both should be asked, “What do you want to do? How do you see the future?” You, as one of the reformist figures who were even imprisoned by that regime, likewise in that regime, what do the custodians of the status quo in their positions do? Do the institutions that provide legitimacy and preserve the status quo have the ability to maintain it? If they do not, how did you want to change the status quo? Are there presently institutions of legitimation that would entrust that task to you?

Aghaei: The reformist current at different junctures has taken different viewpoints; at different steps its thinking and strategies have changed — it has never been static. At one time the idea was that we should bargain and be inside the government so we could bring about change — that was the thesis. We thought that if we didn't have a foothold in governance, we could use its platforms and the power of the pen; to some extent that worked. In Mr. Khatami’s era, when reformists were active, dozens of journals and newspapers were easily published and there wasn’t censorship. In Mr. Ahmadinejad’s era a tight closure was imposed. In Mr. Rouhani’s era reformists mostly supported him and a relative openness reappeared, but that relative space no longer had the previous authority, so it became a grey area — not pitch black, but not fully bright either — it produced some results. In Mr. Raeisi’s era, with the unification of the three branches and the governing institutions becoming highly consolidated and cohesive, this caused a shift in public thinking among reformists: they decided they should choose a different path than pursuing official posts. After the incident of Mr. Raeisi’s death, when Mr. Pezeshkian ran as a candidate, I don’t think reformists felt the kind of hope they once did. I was among the last who, after some who were outside reformists and conservatives in the gray spectrum felt hopeful, still thought — otherwise I was someone who participated in elections and helped; many were like me — we said even if Mr. Pezeshkian attains office his hands will be tied. The reformists’ endorsement was formalistic and traditional. Transformist elements and many reformists, from that recent presidential election onward, were not very hopeful. That’s not to say nothing exists — after all you look, the Security Council blocks a bill in some places, the government uses its tools in some areas — but it isn’t fundamental. Something is better than nothing, but the president can no longer have the authority to resolve freedom issues; censorship and confrontations remain. If you see openings on issues like hijab, it’s the people. Therefore the analysis among reformists has become: do not put your hopes only on being inside the ruling structure. Transformation is not necessarily achieved by holding official posts. The tools have diversified — at one time we thought the parliamentary podium was an important platform; today it is one of the weakest. At one time we thought state TV was decisive; today it seeks an audience and your media reach can be greater. These ideas have found an audience. Today many reformists inclined toward transformation are moving toward civil actions rather than governmental moves. Today, if they pursue the right to assemble, that right already exists in the constitution; so do the right to strike and cultural issues and breaking taboos — these are now the transformative demands. In my view, the enlightened reformist forces — those without governmental veneer — are in this camp; some are imprisoned and are still struggling. But they don’t want society to become a victim of unknown movements. Our point is that violent moves or actions that could throw society into turmoil and then be hard to contain are not acceptable. We seek a transformative, problem-solving path that can address deeply the things we pursue — democracy, justice, foreign policy, and so on — by a route that inflicts the least harm on society. If this path fails, it will certainly move toward radical and violent transformation. Honestly, we cannot say we know what will happen.

Fear of violence: a tool for slowing things down or a protector

Motaharnia: A very important point in the existing literature about reformists and their presence in the public sphere is that we worry if reform fails, violent movements may arise within social forces. In the 2000s (the 80s in the Iranian calendar) it was reformism — although it began in ’97 (1376) — that peaked and sought to create conditions whereby, gradually, through reforms that were suppressed, transformation would occur. Was Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s candidacy not a product of this process? In 2013 (1392) that message was heard to some extent, and despite the disqualification of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani — who had been criticized by both reformists and conservatives and whose eligibility was not approved — he, with his politics and prudence, kept Hassan Rouhani in the field. In 2013 a quiet but effective electoral movement took place and Hassan Rouhani ran. Reformists even supported him more than Pezeshkian; in the first term he achieved successes: inflation was controlled and growth increased. But in his second term Rouhani reached a point where, for reasons he alone knows, he moved closer to the ruling system — the cabinet he formed was more aligned with that meaning. Was it pressure? Or did he want to secure a better position for the near future? Yet in 2017 (1396) we saw the movements in Mashhad in Dey — in this trajectory, hasn’t the pretext that “we’re worried society will move beyond reformism into violence” frozen movements and slowed people’s speed to escape ‘nowness’ (aknoon-zadegi), as I call it? ‘Nowness’ means you can neither return to the past nor want to, but you’re also afraid to go to the future. In terms of the formula of movement, by frightening society with the prospect of violence you tell people that if they leave the field there is a high possibility that conditions for violence will grow. If that possibility didn’t exist at the time of the 1979 revolution, why didn’t the revolutionaries of ’79 accept the reformists who spoke then? They didn’t listen to them, but they achieved liberation from ‘nowness’ — I didn’t coin that term; it’s from Manouchehri and Asadi in a voice that was never heard. The late Mohammad Reza Pahlavi said society suffers from ‘nowness’ and if it escapes it will explode — and the revolutionaries then created that liberation from ‘nowness’. They encouraged and provoked it; even factions now attributed to the previous regime say: “The people — the people I’m close to and talk with — tell me that since you are with the reformists you are a reformist,” while I am an exploratory teacher; I’ve talked with conservatives, clerics, etc., because I want to dissect the dimensions of the issue. Don’t you think you are doing the same thing and slowing people down under the pretext of violence? As they say, if something happens in Iran it will become Syria — a civil war will break out — Iran is not Syria. As they say, Iran will be North Korea; Iran is not North Korea and not Libya — Iran is Iran, it has its own specific features. In this power game how do you see the situation? Do you analyze Iran’s near future — which I understand in its contextual texture — on the basis that if people move toward an unknown future it will drown in violence? How do you analyze the movement of society?

Aghaei: The point you mentioned is a concern shared by most political actors who are sincere in the field. I don’t care about those who are political opportunists; there are people who seek to preserve position, posts, or power or chase governmental opportunities — they have always existed and still do. I don’t deny that even in the opposition there are such people; in the opposition you hear many who shout extreme, bellicose slogans. Personally, I believe in historical determinism — long ago people strongly opposed this idea — if you recall they wrote books: historical determinism means history is not static; it moves on its own, whether you want it to or not, and the path must be traversed. Society must reach democracy, must reach developmental governance — governance that preserves citizens’ rights, that accepts people’s participation — the principles of good governance today. They should reach this and they will, of course everything is relative and not absolute. Look at many societies that are happy, wealthy, and have reached democracy — even among them, when you investigate, their ideals differ; our perspective is specific.

Examine the course of developments in the explosion of information and communications — many tools have changed and people have become aware. Reformist, conservative, counter-revolutionary, pro-revolutionary, overthrow-supporter — a large portion of the people have moved along this spectrum. Each ideological current and its supporters, if they want to take a national view, must see that first they accept reaching this goal — that is, they must not be two-faced: one face a dictator and one face shouting freedom. They must clearly define what they mean by democracy, explain what they mean by citizens’ rights; anyone can propose routes to reach there. I think you cannot view reformists through a single frame — reformists have become diverse; a wide spectrum of them are not traditional reformists. One type is transformative and argues that we should reach this point through civil paths; another group may say we’ll take a detour and get there faster via harsh street methods. Even among conservatives there may be elements who say, “We accept this but if we operate covertly (under the cloak) we can move things faster,” like Seyyed Jamal Asadabadi’s thesis of being at the Ottoman court and then mobilizing popular movements from there — it was a thesis in its time. People and political currents now are not what they were thirty or forty years ago; they have changed. As someone within the reformist fold I say true reformists and political activists now are not seeking governmental posts; they should not and do not create brakes because of posts. Their path is, as I said, to establish a discourse, to win public opinion, and to secure certain rights — whether given or not we must obtain them: the right to assemble, strike, and protest — until we reach the point we have defined. This is a path to get there, not a brake preventing arrival.

Motaharnia: This is a consequence that can occur in society — society interprets it this way when reformists are labeled as “status-quo preservers” and when the youth do not gravitate toward reformists.

Aghaei: Many of the radical and street-level movements of the past one or two decades — think of the Arab Spring — look at Egypt’s fate; they ended up somewhere else. Ultimately, results matter: did many countries reach their desired outcomes? If we can get the national, popular, and intellectual currents to agree — it doesn’t have to be called “reformism,” it could be called “fundamental transformations” — and move along that path, the majority of reformists are inclined toward this. I am inside that circle, in contact with individuals; their thinking has become fundamentalized. They even recount past mistakes openly, without pretense, and they have nothing to lose — but we must not let the country descend into chaos. The fear is that if something happens, the situation will worsen.

Motaharnia: You do not deny that this fear exists, that it is transmitted to society. Yet you admit that through its own perspective, the transmission of this fear slows things down, reducing the speed of a society that seeks change even within a transformative framework, not necessarily revolutionary. On the other hand, the current system, as the guardian of the status quo, pressures political actors who are reformists; it monitors them and prevents them from taking the field. If they do enter, the outcome is what we observe in the current 13th government. So a paradox arises, and a generational gap among reformists becomes possible.

Aghaei: On the surface, yes. What is the duty here?

Authority and Generational Gap

Motaharnia: I want to discuss authority in reformism and the generational gap.

Aghaei: When public opinion forms, it is not always accurate; media flows and propaganda can distort it.

Erosion of Trust: Media and Propaganda

Motaharnia: Influence can emerge.

Aghaei: I say, as thinking human beings, as at least a simple expert, I have duties: to show a path to the people even if they don’t accept it at first. We say that along different paths, the goal is sacred. I have personally paid the cost — imprisoned, punished, barred from leaving the country for years. I still say: is it better for the movement to arrive later but more securely, or to think it has arrived sooner and repeat past mistakes? As someone who can still think and express myself and has past experience, I say we should preserve this path as long as possible. Yes, it may reach a point where it loses effectiveness, and then the story changes, anyone could become an element of disruption. But as long as possible, we should follow a civil path and resolve foundations civilly, even if it takes a little longer.

Motaharnia: In this program I am not seeking an interview; I want a conversation-based dialogue with friends from different intellectual currents. I ask questions, reflect, and from the root questions, other questions emerge.

Different intellectual currents represent various branches of thought, the Iranian intellectual sphere, and Soroush’s multidimensional thought — all of which are now flourishing and radiating. The pain from transitions over past decades, the pressures inflicted on Iranians in previous centuries, seems to present a new generation. This new generation, although apparently indifferent to the realm of thought, shows in practice a desire for actions that are not defined by the previous generations. As a future-oriented thinker, I believe this generation is freed from many weights of the past — they resist past burdens, want to uproot them, discard them, seize present opportunities, and move toward a future they want to construct themselves, not one imposed by previous generations. This characteristic is somewhat visible in today’s generation moving toward the future.

Do young people act on what I have said? How much do you believe in this point? How do you analyze my remarks? I have been among young reformists and conservatives; my historical and lived experience has involved sitting with these generations, hearing their voices, and learning alongside them — now I also learn from you. How aligned is the young generation with reformism?

Aghaei: You’ve raised a very important question, a deep conceptual idea that must be viewed historically and assessed scientifically. Young reformists, like other young people — political or not — share generational traits. The generation that has emerged in the last two decades has fundamental differences with previous generations, even with revolutionary ones. They were born into a world of communication; over 80% of them had computers, phones, and software from birth. They grew up in a context that can be hard to comprehend; often they reject us out of respect, while we pass over unknowns in our own way. But the reality is their demands and methods are different. Those identified as Generation Z or Alpha, with globally shared traits, operate transparently — they see matters in zeros and ones, perhaps with more humor, but in essence like a computer: black-and-white. They don’t deal in pretense, calculation, or politeness. Such transformations have always existed — during our revolution we were young and had generational differences with those before us. Now we have become the elders; we must understand this generation and their desires. They are not ideological — whereas in the past ideology was central, this generation is result-oriented. What they see is their judgment criterion; they are concrete, seek freedom fully, are not tolerant of limits, and are unwilling to accept compromises. These are their traits. Regarding Gen Z and Alpha, much has been written; I think this difference exists.

Young reformists, by extension, share these traits, but how they act politically is naturally influenced by family beliefs, relativities, causality, and factors connected to traditional reformism. Many may adopt a more measured, gradual approach — they differ from the broader youth population in this regard and may favor a slower, steadier movement.

Motaharnia: This generation sees things in black and white. From my lived experience with Generation Z and young reformists, or even with principlists whose young members have separated, for example, I encountered a group of young reformists in the 2000s through the student organization and my classes over 28 years of teaching. Most of them, when they became politically disillusioned, turned to the economic field and realized that they needed to redevelop themselves economically, and sometimes they return to politics, trying to have an impact based on their interests. I have seen a wide section of young reformists in this way. In 2024, when Mr. Pezeshkian came, he faced Mr. Jalili and Qalibaf; there were sessions where they contacted me for consultation, and I spoke with them—I saw the same tendency. Most of them no longer step into politics; they only want a political impact linked to their economic activities. Out of, say, ten people, only two vote, and even then based on a sense of political duty framed as continuing reformism but aiming to create change through the ballot box. I can generalize this; I’m not saying I only rely on those close to me. I have interacted for decades with young principlists as well.

The issue for me here is: in reformist discourse, are we witnessing a significant loss of young people or not? If we are, why? Can you, as a reformist, redefine their presence?

Aghaei: The issue goes beyond politics. In the political realm, politics is about power-seeking; factions and parties are essentially formed with the intention of seeking power.

Motaharnia: Max Weber says a party is the house of political power—there is no doubt about that.

Aghaei: Therefore, when we analyze age hierarchies and youth in politics, many young people within reformist or principlist circles are influenced by their families. Naturally, the parents’ beliefs affect them, although these can change quickly. Usually, escape from ideology and refinement is greater in principlist political circles—they are not necessarily attracted to reformism. Even among reformists, there has traditionally been significant attrition, though it is less rapid among reformist reformers. I accept this principle, and we need to think about it. This is precisely why we insist that even if these reformist reformers leave, in what intellectual framework will they operate? Will they proceed without weight, without form, or should we guide them through an internal struggle, leading them with this mindset toward a goal using a specific method?

The second discussion is outside politics but important. It is worth exploring more deeply. In past generations, we made a series of value judgments, many of which may have been invalid or mistaken, but some values defined as social values in families and society are rapidly influenced by globalization, the age of communication, and the information explosion, and may be fading. Of course, studies and surveys are needed to determine whether Generation Z, Alpha, and the next generation, now forming, truly adhere to a set of principles and values that may be fundamental to human society. Are they weakening? I think to some extent they are, and this matters for all those leading societies. In the West, this issue is intensely discussed—not just with a physical outcome, not only seeing the economic aspect—but we must guide our generation toward frameworks appropriate to their conditions and capacities.

Which generation leads whom?

Motaharnia: The reality shows that you do not guide this generation toward a place you design; ultimately, this generation leads you to where they want. Events in Iran from 1999, 2009, 2013, 2017, 2019, and 2022 are compressed in this sense. As a futurist, I predicted in 2017 that in 2019 an unprecedented event would occur, and it did. I expected 2020 to repeat differently, but COVID-19 intervened. In 2021, I emphasized that it would happen in 2022, and later I mentioned other points. From this perspective, you say we can reconstruct—but we must ask: do the reformist leaders truly have the capacity to identify these generational changes? There is great plurality among reformists, never unified, and apparently unlikely to unify. They claim, using your language, that we sit down and reconstruct, guiding toward the right direction—but with inadequate understanding of this generation, you say they are binary, black and white thinkers. I don’t fully agree. This generation hasn’t become binary in facing the current state, but internally, they clash, argue, and solve problems themselves. Children of reformist families, like principlist children, do not align with their parents but with rivals of their parents in governance; they find another angle. If they benefit from parental support for a comfortable life, many fall on the opposite spectrum. Can you truly reconstruct them, or will they lead you where they want?

Aghaei: We have a duty to keep the generation on proper principles, like an economic manager guiding a failing business using accumulated experiences. These experiences may not have economic results but can guide the next generation and those who follow. The current generation is disillusioned—no doubt—frustrated by unmet slogans, hypocrisy, lies, zigzagging moves, and dishonesty.

Motaharnia: Frustrated by “sliding” too.

Aghaei: Exactly. There is deep frustration among both principlist and reformist families, both in governance and outside. Its waves appear in social media. But the reality is they are not abandoning responsibility. We cannot just float along with the waves or stand still while they move. Especially at our age, we have neither the right nor the tools to dictate. Even the government, with batons, arms, and prisons, cannot fully control them. We cannot. Suppose this generation, despite frustrations, has attentiveness and intellect—we must not lose it. We must systematically pass on our experiences. If the traditional forms are worn-out and demotivating, change them. If civil methods are to develop, why must it be within reformist ranks? Help them organize, think, and maintain frameworks. Patriotism, family structure, ethics, and spirituality are crucial. Business, the focus of the new generation, also has principles. In the West, loyalty is being revalued. This generation should not be left to mere trendiness. If we fail, a generation may arise that, ignorant of our cultural heritage spanning thousands of years, will be exploited by foreigners.

In politics, principles exist. This generation should not go in a direction where, if they gain power, they oppress each other. We must review where we were hurt—those who imprisoned us were initially freedom fighters, but became dictators. This generation, not holding governmental responsibility, is freedom-loving. If they gain governance, will they suppress each other?

Motaharnia: Is there a tactical language to capture the generation? Those who fought for freedom had the same goals but became so entangled in practice that they acted worse than before. Some did. I lived alongside you, never aligning fully with reformists or principlists; I always tried to learn and stay beside them. You have a tactical language, you formed an ideology, turned the revolution into an Islamic one, then jurisprudential, then ideologized. Some declared themselves absolute truth and others absolute falsehood, acting to strike the false. Now, do you want to guide this generation through ideology toward what you deem proper and necessary? A new discourse exists, and the youth may have already moved ahead, making it impossible to appropriate them.

Aghaei: Past events don’t mean we should discard everything. Communities lived in villages and cities, built houses, generations grew, cities expanded, modern architecture arrived. Many old houses were demolished and rebuilt. Architectural logic tells us to examine positive

Motaharnia: Do you equate laïcité with secularism?

Aghaei: To put it more academically—though I’m not an expert—the fact is that religion is being sidelined, ideology is leaving governance; we are certain this trend exists. One distinguishing feature of future governance is precisely this. The next issue is the “transnational” functioning in governance: we must definitely connect with the global community. One characteristic is that we will inevitably participate in global market divisions. Economic potentials, resource bases, will naturally become important. Knowledge production is no longer exclusive to one country; science has become global. Today, an Iranian scientist and a Chinese scientist are connected. It seems that the future governance model is moving away from religion, though in Iran, some traditions—particularly positive ones—still exist and can be incorporated as governance practices. However, there are also risks: governance may face damage from the influx of the new generation and lack of planning. If experiences are not transmitted, these risks will materialize. Therefore, I predict governance without religious rulings for Iran’s future, integrated and connected with the global society. Principles of democracy are relative—today, various forms of democracy exist worldwide. Asian democracy differs from European democracy. The model in Iran is unpredictable but will develop its own form.

Three words for future governance

Motaharnia: Years ago, when I was studying development, I remember Taylor wrote in a book that flags are no longer the symbol of a nation; universities are the national symbols of countries. Today, I would say even universities are not—the generations are the symbols of national development. How Generation Z thinks is crucial for national development. If you had to describe Iran’s future governance model in three words, what would they be?

Aghaei: Rationality, rationality, rationality.

Motaharnia: Reason teaches us to survive; rationality teaches us to live; wisdom teaches us to build life. We need wisdom. If the next generation loses hope in politics, what kind of system would you propose to rebuild meaning in politics?

Aghaei: Under this assumption, I am very hopeful for a secular governance based on rationality. Considering our existing assets, my assumptions are not pessimistic. The children of this land respect traditions—they do not abandon them lightly. Even if they are upset or angry, they are intelligent; in reality, they do not discard their assets just because they distance themselves from emotions. Hopefully, with these assets, they can create a good governance model.

Full file of Abdi Media's interview with Hedayat Aghaei