Water Crisis in Iran – Conversation between Mohammad Darvish, environmental activist, and Isa Bozorgzadeh, spokesperson for Iran’s water industry.

Water Crisis, Exploitation, or Dam Construction: A Contradiction?

Drouish: Today we want to talk about one of Iran’s most pressing current crises, namely the water crisis. We invited one of the experienced experts in this field, Dr. Isa Bozorgzadeh.

One of the topics you’ve been paying a lot of attention to recently is water exploitation. You explicitly emphasize that if Iran is to return to an acceptable level of resilience, reduce imbalances and land subsidence, and become a country with sustainable development, it must move toward reducing water exploitation in all 31 provinces. This reduction in exploitation is precisely what environmental activists and independent experts have been demanding.

Regarding the method of reducing exploitation: when we talk about reducing exploitation, it means that both the Ministry of Energy and the structure of the government must see a reduction in livelihoods and businesses that are heavily dependent on water. In other words, we must move toward an economic boom that is not water-dependent. Yet, just last week I heard that your ministry promised that 84 more dams are under construction and will soon become operational. Dam construction is one of the factors that ultimately increases water exploitation. This tool enables further exploitation. Doesn’t this contradict the ideal you’re talking about? If such a serious paradox exists within your ministry regarding your ideal, how can the rest of the government structure be expected to align with you?

Bozorgzadeh: If you ask me to summarize the solution for water and national development, ecosystem rescue, and creating sustainability in the ecosystem in one sentence, I would say we could write dozens of thousand-page books on environmental and water details. But if we want a single sentence, the golden sentence, in my view, is reducing water exploitation to the level of ecosystem resilience in each region. This single word conveys the whole idea; additional explanations or exceptions only add branches or caveats that could even harm this thinking.

Reducing Water Exploitation to the Limit of Ecosystem Resilience

Bozorgzadeh: If I can align the audience with this sentence—“reducing water exploitation to the limit of ecosystem resilience”—this sentence alone is self-sufficient. This single line is enough for anyone to understand what needs to be done. We must take actions, and if these actions are not taken, we will not reach this goal. Imagine a locked and twisted door attached to the wall of a fortress; on the other side of the wall is “reducing water exploitation,” meaning ecological salvation is supposed to happen there. On this side, there is a manager like me and an activist like you. I strongly believe that even at the level of the government—not even at the level of all three branches—the reason the three branches cannot get the job done properly is that, as I have repeatedly explained, optimal governance in any area like water, environment, development, health, education, etc., requires three actors: (1) the government (the state and its three branches), (2) the market (using economic and financial tools), and (3) society. If you don’t make space for the other two actors, you won’t achieve the desired outcome. I know of no global experience where it worked otherwise. Even a country like China requires two active actors to achieve sustainable development. Logically, it should be one-third each.

The first correction I want to make in your introduction is: do not limit the decision-making space to the government or even all three branches. Over the past decades, 80% of the water and development decision space has been occupied by the government (all three branches), and this has been a major mistake. We cannot reduce the role of the market or society. When we say the “market actor,” people assume we are referring solely to pure capitalism and economic interests at the expense of the environment, but that is not the case.

Market Actor = Private Sector

Drouish: That’s different from the private sector.

Bozorgzadeh: It can include the private sector. The main actions regarding climate change have progressed through market tools; review the Kyoto and Paris agreements, the most famous environmental treaties in the world. If you, as a polluter in Europe, build a factory and pollute, someone in Iran or India initiates a green project, and you help finance these green projects—that’s an economic tool. It’s partly a social tool, too. International and national activists and organizations are involved, but the main mechanism in the Kyoto and Paris agreements is economic.

Drouish: That’s why diverse stakeholders are present in these treaties and conferences.

Bozorgzadeh: Exactly, because those two actors are active. Government representatives are also involved. I don’t want to name specific countries, but Scandinavian countries are famous for environmental protection. In all countries, water and environmental economics are enforced; polluters pay. Rivers and environments are protected, and illegal users face strict penalties. The market actor also performs its role.

There is extensive global experience showing how the market and societal actors contribute to sustainable development, environmental protection, and water management. Environmental resources—water, soil, forests, migratory birds—must be exploited only up to the limit of resilience. These tools guide this process.

I tried to start this discussion to break the illusion that ministries like Energy, Planning, Agriculture, the government, or even the Parliament and Judiciary alone can sustain the country’s ecosystems. This is not to diminish their role.

Tools and Obstacles to Participation

Drouish: The point is that currently, the tools to enable the private sector, market actors, or society to participate equally in these discussions don’t exist. Some security organizations even prevent NGOs from participating. Historically, we haven’t had equitable dialogue. Your invitation seems idealistic or utopian.

Bozorgzadeh: No. My perspective is that as time progresses, everyone increasingly realizes we can’t manage alone. Eighty percent of water and development is handled by the government. My view is not that security actors prevent participation; my view is that people like me, or anyone in my position, worry about losing their own authority. I’ve been promoting this thinking for several years. Rational individuals everywhere support me: in the executive, legislative, judiciary, and among ordinary people. When you speak the truth, your message finds its audience and influence.

The main resistance comes from executive bodies and the legislature. They have interests in maintaining the status quo. The first interest is that they do not lose their jobs or authority. You must understand I am speaking about myself. Even if you create a new order, everyone has a role, but I’m used to making 80% of decisions from morning to evening; I can make 20–30%. It would even make things more lively, improve mental health, and increase my welfare as a government manager. But since all decisions converge on me, I am in a better position. For real change, it must happen in government and legislature—they have the greatest impact. Officials must understand that many solutions lie in letting go.

If Everyone Participates

Drouish: Let’s assume this happens: the government reaches this level of understanding and insight, the members of parliament are genuine, emerging from a free election, and chambers of commerce and NGOs are present in the working groups. Your ideal of the three pillars working together and discussing water exploitation reduction becomes reality. In that case, do you—as the national water authority—have a map showing how much each province should reduce its water use before negotiating with the market and society actors?

Bozorgzadeh: Fortunately, we had good interactions with Parliament during the drafting of the Seventh Development Plan. In Table 7, Article 37 of the plan, it is exactly specified, at the national level, how much surface water and groundwater should be allocated, and the shares for agriculture, industry, drinking water, and environmental needs are defined. The most well-known figure is 15 billion cubic meters for addressing water imbalance. Parliament, with wisdom, accepted the Ministry of Energy and government proposals and added good clauses in this regard.

After the plan was approved and communicated to the government, our task in the government was to allocate these imbalances and the share of surface and groundwater among 31 provinces through eight specialized committee meetings of the Supreme Water Council and two main council meetings.

Drouish: So, the 15 billion cubic meters are distributed among the 31 provinces?

Bozorgzadeh: Yes. Then we determined how much each water source should supply each sector—for example, how much groundwater should go to drinking, agriculture, or industry. Surface water is also allocated similarly. If a province has access to seawater, how much it should take from the sea. How much treated wastewater should be used—wastewater is not for drinking or agriculture but for industry.

Drouish: How much will agriculture’s share be reduced?

Bozorgzadeh: The reduction is also determined. All figures are specified. This is a major step, achieved with Parliament’s support and this goal setting.

Drouish: Is the government cooperating?

Bozorgzadeh: Yes, with the Ministry of Interior, Planning Organization, Crisis Management, Environment, Agriculture, and the Ministry of Energy.

Drouish: What are the obstacles?

Bozorgzadeh: Obstacles? No. We designed five programs. The most important parts are supply and distribution, and demand management. Water problems cannot be solved by supply alone—it is increasingly ineffective. We must focus on demand management. Any technological measure to reduce consumption, like installing aerators on taps or showers, is demand management. Any measure that guides development patterns toward low-water-demand development is also demand management. We have identified 13 actions for these areas. Water hazards like floods and droughts are another section to address. In public opinion, people think all these are “water governance,” but in proper terminology, these are water resources management. Our fifth program is improving water governance—meaning institutional reforms and better business environment. Water governance and water resources management are different, though commonly conflated.

We have developed 49 actions under these five programs. We presented them to the president, who instructed us to send them to all 31 provinces. He said we cannot create one-size-fits-all solutions from Tehran; we must involve the provinces. Therefore, we sent the plan to all 31 governors and asked them to review it, consult with local universities and experts, collect regional feedback, and return it to the central system. After agreement in a national meeting with 31 governors and national officials, the plan will be announced as a national movement.

بدون فیلتر در کست‌باکس بشنوید

15 Billion by the End of the Seventh Plan — Reality or Slogan?

Darvish: 15 billion must be reduced by the end of the Seventh Plan. Two years have passed now.

Bozorgzadeh: The second year has started.

Darvish: Is there an institution responsible for reporting performance? Do you remember when you submitted the plan to reduce the imbalances, and then the person in charge resigned before completing it, saying they couldn’t reach their goals? Now, is there an institution that should report on the performance?

Bozorgzadeh: The Secretariat of the Supreme Water Council is responsible. My colleagues, the Deputy of Water and Water & Wastewater Organization, and the Ministry of Energy system are following up, but ultimately, it is a collective responsibility.

Darvish: Why haven’t the programs yielded results?

Darvish: It was a 20-year program, and this year is the final year. Practically, we haven’t reached anywhere; our situation is worse than the first year. What guarantee exists that this ideal and visionary program will be realized?

Bozorgzadeh: That water load reduction must happen is not a discovery of this session. I believe many experts considered this even before the revolution. Some publications, discussions, and laws of that time, like “prohibited plains” or restrictions on illegal wells, date back to pre-revolution years. Iranian engineers knew limitations on water withdrawals were necessary. In the Sixth Plan, there were plans for restoration and balancing, drought adaptation, and a national knowledge-based food security document. Numbers differed, and it varies by plain. But this isn’t a new discovery. If someone now says that water conditions are unacceptable, it adds nothing new to society.

The question is why it didn’t succeed. My answer: Were Iran’s authorities uninterested? No. Did they not try? No, they tried. Were they not committed to the ideals? They were. Perhaps one person misused it, but the majority of managers working were committed. Why didn’t it happen? I believe the main issue is that the tools needed to unlock these “locks” were not properly designed. Among various programs, the most important with the most tools is restoration and balancing. Drought adaptation, planning water allocation, and the national knowledge-based food security document are based on this. They lacked proper tools; some propositions were incompatible.

The message I give: From now on, important and emotional statements are only part of the work; they aren’t problem-solving. Closing illegal wells is a tool, but in the past, either there were no tools, tools were wrong, or we didn’t include the other two institutions (market and society). The government institution was acting alone, and fundamentally it can’t do this alone.

For example, the tool of closing illegal wells: If you can find anyone opposing it in the past, I haven’t seen anyone. Why didn’t it progress? If we closed one well, two others were created. The reason: the illegal well tool was misdefined in two or three ways. First, as an operator of the Ministry of Energy, before closing a well, you must go to the street corner and get a judicial order; coercive power begins after engineering is done. You don’t treat citizens this way.

We had to use the market institution, activating and energizing other economic areas, giving farmers alternative opportunities so they would leave the wells voluntarily. It’s not just a legal provision; alternative livelihoods are essential. In the past, proposals for alternative livelihoods were very weak, e.g., “We want to reduce water from Zayandeh Rud farmers, so give some help to this industry.” That isn’t a true alternative livelihood. Or in Lake Urmia, if reduction occurs, then see if we can fund non-planting programs so the farmer’s current year life is secured. The government plays a role, but the economic and social institutions weren’t activated. From the government’s side, it has no effect; from the media, you don’t speak; from people with no personal interest who seek public benefit, these issues are not voiced.

I have the right to speak strongly here because I’m responsible for water.

Darvish: You can’t just rely on society or tools when, practically, they don’t have the means to act. In a government where principles are secondary, and the president proudly says he isn’t affiliated with any political faction as a value, when strong parties don’t exist to challenge the government, you can’t say “We didn’t use society, so this challenge happened.”

Bozorgzadeh: You seem very interested in giving a political angle. I strongly avoid this part.

Darvish: The reality is, looking at the last three decades, one of the biggest failures is that the people’s voice hasn’t been heard due to unwise actions by some of the authorities.

Bozorgzadeh: We’re talking about water and development, not political decision-making. Regarding water and development, it can easily be done. Wherever I discuss it, it’s welcomed; only technical challenges may be presented. In Zurich, if you want to build a bridge or asphalt a road, it’s unrelated to parties. In Zurich’s municipality, they even do online polls: “We want to build this bridge.” In Japan, for water projects, maybe not everyone votes, but most participants say yes or no. It’s unrelated to parties. You may have personal opinions as a citizen, but in water and development, it’s straightforward.

Water discussions we’ve started show that water is a social issue, not a political one. Anyone trying to politicize it is not serving national goals. Water should be seen as a social, environmental, and cultural issue so that everyone can freely discuss it. Development should be presented as social welfare to people so it can be broadly discussed. That’s why I ask you not to politicize it; politicizing this doesn’t help.

Another Tool: Participatory Management

Bozorgzadeh: Another tool I want to mention is participatory management. It is a well-known tool, but it hasn’t progressed. In Jihad Agriculture and the Ministry of Energy, it hasn’t moved forward. We have 1,600–1,700 water-related associations, but their main duty is distributing fertilizer and pesticides. We are talking about water flows and trends.

In the Seventh Plan, we proposed to the Planning Organization and the government, and it was approved in parliament, that our legal obligation should be limited to governance tasks, while operational management of aquifers should be handed over to associations. Now we are defining tools to make these associations self-sufficient; if they are not self-governing, it won’t work.

Fear of Delegation

Darvish: I know some people are afraid.

Bozorgzadeh: Unfortunately, yes. But the reform movement is strong. For example, they say, “You want to hand this aquifer association to a farmer.” That farmer is not as skilled as an engineer or university professor. But in the country, if you elect a politician, you require experience and expertise, yet the law allows the city and village councils to consist of ordinary people.

Darvish: Some think even dividing work to city and village councils was a mistake.

Bozorgzadeh: Well, there are many water and environmental reformers as well.

Darvish: Do you agree that your work hasn’t been widely publicized? We, in civil society, don’t know that such wise voices exist in the government and water authorities, which need support and negotiation so you’re not under pressure in the ministry.

Bozorgzadeh: These texts have been approved, and now many understand them. We really must reduce resistance with explanation and cultural awareness. For example, the farmer working on the aquifer knows their life better than us. I am not saying we give them governance authority. What is the standard for drinking water? Governance must decide that. Two farmers or local officials cannot set drinking water standards. But they can identify illegal wells within their community, form organizations, and use internal conflict resolution without burdening the government. The government only sets annual water withdrawal limits; how they achieve it internally is their business. Monitoring systems must report results monthly so we know what they are doing.

Darvish: There are 4 million farmers in our country. Our mistake over the last 60–70 years in controlling illegal withdrawals was that the government directly confronted well owners and farmers—“the nanny is more concerned than the mother.” My message to colleagues: 70% of your plains are prohibited or critically prohibited. What do you have to lose in delegating this to civil society? Health is also important. Has the government directly intervened in citizens’ lives? No. Does the Ministry of Health do this? No. From birth to death, hospitals (public or private) handle birth and death certificates.

Education is also important. Does the Minister of Education personally approve each diploma or fourth-grade certificate? No. Schools and teachers handle it. We can trust people and civil society with a structured system. But when it comes to water, we have not trusted them—this was a wrong approach. Governance standards can be defined, and we can move forward.

Bozorgzadeh: You must make it attractive using market tools. You cannot ignore them. These associations should not be government-paid employees. If a civil society association is active somewhere, they shouldn’t rely on me for salary. Industry must manage itself.

Darvish: Industry must understand water load and ecological capacity from land-use planning, the Planning Organization, and the Ministry of Energy. I was speaking with an investor in Kashan, asking why they invested in steel there. They said they wanted to help their province—they have a sense of patriotism. But the ecological capacity of Isfahan is saturated, while a large province like Sistan & Baluchestan has almost no factories. Can we just leave it to the market to decide?

Bozorgzadeh: That is a governance issue. Ecological carrying capacity is a governance matter and cannot be delegated to associations or other institutions.

Darvish: But in practice, it has happened. Half of the country’s industrial units are only a quarter of the units in Isfahan.

Bozorgzadeh: My assessment: The government and governance have been the only actors. In governance systems, state power alone can’t control the market; it can limit civil society. We need to start a dialogue on water and development where, after defining governance criteria, the government steps back.

Darvish: But in practice, the government has facilitated the same path: building dams, water transfer projects, desalination plants, and new water resources. When you announce that we must reduce water consumption and imbalance by 15 billion cubic meters in less than four years, but simultaneously build 84 dams, it’s a paradox. You’re not only failing to honor the 15 billion goal, but by the end of the Seventh Plan, the intensity of imbalance will increase.

Bozorgzadeh: You reduce the discussion to dams.

Darvish: If I were speaking with a Ministry of Agriculture official, I’d discuss another topic.

Bozorgzadeh: You are giving too much concession to dams. In your view, supply should not be touched at all. I am not defending 84 dams. One item in the Seventh Plan, proposed by the Ministry of Energy and approved by the Planning Organization and parliament, requires all Ministry of Energy projects to be reviewed and optimized. Almost 200 projects have been selected for review. I am not against optimization; the law supports it. The conceptual model is that the supply side must be heavy, the consumption side light, to balance them.

Darvish: Water transfer projects from the sea: when you say this, all experts agree that due to climate change and reduced renewable water resources, we must turn to unconventional water sources. Is this right? If someone thinks our renewable water resources are decreasing, we shouldn’t add more. This is a debate. The answer to climate change is using unconventional water sources: wastewater and seawater.

Alternative Livelihoods and Attracting People to the Coast

Darvish: On one hand, the state says that coastal areas should be developed for residential, industrial, commercial, and population purposes, and population policies also support this. Experts generally agree, despite some climatic constraints. My question: can we use these opportunities in 27 coastal cities to provide alternative livelihoods for farmers voluntarily, without forcing them to move to the south or islands like Kish and Qeshm?

Creating Attraction: Condition for Successful Alternative Livelihoods

Darvish: There must be attraction.

Bozorgzadeh: Even if we offered them double or triple their property in a coastal location, anyone who volunteers can go—this is a market tool. This is a voluntary change for the farmer, but we create an attractive economic environment. Just as the British migrated to Australia in certain years seeking economic opportunities. Major migrations worldwide have been driven by market mechanisms.

Darvish: One-third of the population in the southern Gulf countries are migrants.

Bozorgzadeh: We don’t fully recognize this. Sometimes we see population settlement in the southern coast as one issue, then wonder about alternative livelihoods in Zayandeh-Rud, Kerman, Shiraz. We need to connect these issues. We are changing the use of many natural resources; about 15 million hectares of natural lands have been lost, and many forests as well. Land conversion should benefit the farmer. Are there global plans for linking these? Yes. Has the Ministry of Energy developed them? Yes, and without opposition.

Darvish: So, market tools must be used to make behavior change for farmers, employees, etc., attractive, not coercion.

Pilot and Scaling: Practical Method

Darvish: Can’t we start with pilot areas, and if successful, scale them up?

Bozorgzadeh: Yes, we have two pilot areas: Zayandeh-Rud and Urmia. In some areas, we designed on-paper plans, e.g., 32,000 hectares in Zayandeh-Rud and 31,000 in Urmia. We created market tools with around $1 billion economic opportunities in each area. These tools can be used, such that the economic equivalent of one hectare of farmland can be exchanged for a small portion of land elsewhere—or even financial instruments to buy shares of government companies.

Darvish: So you are telling the farmer in the Zayandeh-Rud basin: if you give up one hectare of your land, you can get an equivalent anywhere you want.

Bozorgzadeh: Yes, it can be commercial, residential, or financial instruments for stock market investment or bids.

Darvish: Including water rights.

Bozorgzadeh: Land and water should both be voluntarily freed. Global examples show that voluntary programs succeed because there is a meaningful economic incentive. If the farmer isn’t satisfied with the current equation, we can increase it. The economy is tempting, and no government budget is required. The added value comes from the land and natural resources themselves.

Darvish: In the development of Makran?

Bozorgzadeh: Yes, there are many details.

Darvish: Is this documented anywhere?

Bozorgzadeh: Not yet published; these are the initial steps. The goal is to involve the market and speak publicly to encourage participation of the relevant institutions.

Negotiation with the Market: Activating Institutions

Darvish: Activate chambers of commerce and political parties.

Bozorgzadeh: We have made presentations to some, and are ready to present in expert meetings as well.

Conclusion: Is there hope?

Darvish: If you have an important and inspiring message for the public.

Bozorgzadeh: We designed about 49 tools, 5–6 of which are new. I strongly believe in them. Worldwide, the government can never beat the market; even in new Afghanistan, you had to pay in Afghan currency to buy rice. Our understanding is that market and society can support governance in maintaining ecosystems, promoting jobs, and creating welfare. The constitution allows market and society to be fully active in water and development issues, with no obstacle. What exists is resistance to change, which is natural for everyone.

Darvish: And you are hopeful?

Bozorgzadeh: Very hopeful. With the help of media, dedicated managers, patriots, and Iran-lovers, we can face the tough path confidently. With all the sacrifices and values, we can succeed.

Full file: Interview by Abdi Media with Isa Bozorgzadeh, spokesperson for the water industry in the country.