Zarif: If Iran had wanted to build a {atomic} bomb, it would have built one by now.

The delusion these days that reinstating the resolutions would give a better bargaining position is nothing but foolishness.

The people and leaders of Iran view the nuclear program through the lens of dignity.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, our former Foreign Minister, in remarks at the Arms Control Association meeting in Washington — which was held online and broadcast from Tehran — emphasized: In my view, the current delusion that reinstating UN Security Council resolutions against Iran would give the United States and the European Union a better bargaining position is nothing but stupidity.

In practice, this measure undermines engagement-based approaches and provokes mere resistance, destroys the credibility and relevance of diplomacy, thereby removing any role for Europe and deepening hostility toward the United States as an unreliable bully.

A few months before this, two nuclear powers, over 12 days, heavily bombed Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Those attacks targeted scientists, enrichment centers, and so on. Yet Iran neither surrendered nor waived its nuclear rights.

Key facilities were struck, but Iran became more convinced of the necessity of self-reliance and of not trusting the West. People rallied around the flag, the leadership declared victory, and emphasized Iran’s right and intention to continue nuclear activities.

The reality is that Iran’s knowledge “cannot be bombed.”

After these attacks, the debate about leaving the NPT and building weapons surged in society; however, the Supreme Leader openly rejected this growing demand within part of the population.

Now, let us restate the two dominant approaches and see whether either can explain the past three decades (≈1995–2025). The first approach considered Iran a potential proliferator that must be contained at all costs. The second assumed Iran’s goal was to achieve at least a latent capability for nuclear weapons — a so-called “legal capability” — for deterrence.

Both views interpret any Iranian action as a deceptive move, part of a hidden bomb plan, or at least “ambition for a step to the bomb.” The prescription of both views is that Iran should be treated as a “problem” and confronted with pressure: sanctions to strangle the economy, inspections to uncover illicit activity, military action to set back progress, and even regime change to remove the so-called “threat.”

Now, after more than 30 years of stalemate, it is clear that both of the aforementioned perspectives need serious reconsideration. If either interpretation were even partially correct, we would not be in our present position.

If Iran had wanted to build a bomb, it would have built one by now, even though it has paid a higher price for not building it than those who actually have built one. Why has Iran paid such a steep price without completing what Netanyahu claimed 30 years ago would be done within six months (≈1995 claim referring to a 6-month prediction)?

If Iran wanted to do “nuclear blackmail,” why couldn’t the opponents’ extortion through sanctions and naked force stop it? Why, despite economic suffering, did Iran not abandon its nuclear activities in exchange for lucrative offers such as normalization of relations, investments, etc.?

Conversely, if Iran sought deterrence through enrichment by achieving a “legal capability,” why now — when it has been proven that the program, instead of being deterrent, has been used as a pretext and target for attacks and economic pressure — does it not stop enrichment or rush toward building a bomb?

Iran has done neither: it has not surrendered, nor has it now, despite strong social demand and easy legal justifications, rushed toward the bomb. Instead, Iran has persistently pursued civilian nuclear development without weaponization.