A Glance and Several Ambiguities in the Proposal for the Establishment of the Judiciary Protection and Intelligence Organization

The proliferation of parallel security and intelligence agencies and the increase in such organizations reflect the numerous weaknesses and organized corruption within the agencies that are supposed to oversee them. This issue becomes more significant when there is neither centralized nor transparent oversight of their performance.

Given the structural problems in governance and rent-based appointments, security agencies now require precise and transparent oversight and control. Despite the law establishing the Ministry of Intelligence, we are moving away from centralized intelligence and accountability.

The fact that the IRGC Intelligence Organization was established without a legal decree from the Parliament had a primary reason: it was ordered and approved by Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Leader, based on Article 57 of the Constitution (Absolute Guardianship and Leadership of the Nation). According to this principle, his decree takes precedence over the law, and the three branches of government are defined under his authority.

This principle was revised and approved in 1989, and over the years, Ayatollah Khamenei has increasingly relied on this constitutional provision to extend his powers, including the establishment of parallel councils and leadership positions, notably in the military and the creation of the Supreme Command in the Army and Law Enforcement.

Now, in a surprising move, the Islamic Parliament is seeking to elevate an internal center within the Judiciary to an organization through a proposal, not even a bill from the Judiciary or the government. This move contradicts the principle of separation of powers, which, under normal circumstances, would be under the jurisdiction of the head of the Judiciary according to the law.

The proposal does not clarify the powers and organizational hierarchy of this new organization, nor does it define how the organization will relate to the Coordinating Council of Intelligence or why its membership is not included in the proposal.

Most importantly, this organization is becoming a coordinating body between security agencies and the Judiciary, which could undermine judicial independence, even though this issue is currently present in a less overt manner.

The revolutionary representatives have also not specified whether the General Office and Policy-Making of the Supreme Command's Protection and Intelligence will oversee this new organization or not.

Furthermore, in all intelligence organizations, independent protection agencies are responsible for overseeing their personnel. The proposed “Protection and Intelligence Organization” combines the functions of intelligence and independent protection, which constitutes an extraordinary concentration of security power, differing significantly from the role of internal organizational protection.

Moreover, will security-related accusations and cases involving personnel be handled under the authorization of Ayatollah Khomeini and subsequently Ayatollah Khamenei, similar to the personnel of the Ministry of Intelligence in the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces, or by ordinary judiciary courts? Given the potential for corruption due to the extraordinary power of this organization, will cases be handled fairly, justly, and independently?

Finally, what role do the Speaker of Parliament and some members of the IRGC, as well as the accusations related to the #Audio_File case, play in designing and pushing this organization? Are these issues connected?

These are questions and concerns that have arisen for me as a journalist while reading this proposal.

Abdollah Abdi, Abdi Media