Bloody game of war

Professor Bernard Reich, in his article "Israel and the Iran-Iraq War," writes: "The main benefit Israel gained from the Iran-Iraq war was that these two regional powers, both considered enemies of Israel, went to war against each other, providing a respite for Israel." He believes that Israel sought to "maintain a balance of power to prolong the war and prevent either side from winning." In Reich's analysis, the war, in addition to keeping these two countries engaged, divided the Arab world into two poles: one pole, Syria, Libya, and South Yemen, and the other pole, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf states. "The division of the Arab world prevented the formation of a united front against Israel" (Lessons from Strategy, Law, Diplomacy in the Iran-Iraq War, pp. 147-148).

It seems that the US policy also aimed to prolong the bloody Iran-Iraq war until there was no clear winner. Al-Kuwari, then Qatar's representative at the United Nations, wrote about the US and Soviet positions in the war: 'In fact, these two superpowers, despite their contradictory statements, were satisfied with the continuation and prolongation of the war, as long as neither side could prevail over the other.' (Performance of the Security Council in the Iran-Iraq War, p. 201). As long as Iran and Iraq were destroying each other’s countries, the global powers, despite expressing concern over the ongoing war, made no serious effort to end it. In the seventh year, they decided to end the war. Iranian analysts consider the relative success of Karbala 5 (winter of 1987) effective in the superpowers' decision to end the war, but most non-Iranian analysts believe the insecurity of the Persian Gulf in the naval war and the revelation of the McFarlane affair were the main reasons for the US decision to end the war.

disclosure profile disclosure of the McFarlane affair in November 1986, known globally as the US and Israeli assistance to Iran, complicated the American double game and put the US under immense pressure. According to Keddie and Gasiorowski, Americans concluded: 'We must intervene directly to end the prolonged Iran-Iraq war.' (The Bipolar System and the Iran-Iraq War, p. 414) In July 1987, Resolution 598 was passed to end the war. Iran's reaction to the resolution was negative, but for the first time, all five permanent members of the Security Council had agreed to end the war. According to the UN Secretary-General, in a meeting held with the five permanent members of the Security Council in September 1987, Schultz, the US Secretary of State, summarized the view of the five countries: 'We all want to end the war. We all support Resolution 598.' (Toward Peace, p. 255)

(1) Iraqis must resist well to prevent any victory for Iran. (2) The war must become more painful for Iranians than ever. (3) The flow of weapons to Iran must be reduced through another Security Council resolution, and (4) extensive international pressure must be applied to this country. (Toward Peace, p. 267)

Many realized the war was in its final months. Mohammad Javad Zarif, an Iranian diplomat at the UN, recalls that around January 1988: 'Michael Steiner called me and said, "You now have the upper hand, but this year will be your defeat in the war. Accept the resolution before you are defeated. I will never forget this." (Iranian Diplomacy and Resolution 598, p. 249). A few months later, the German UN representative's words became a reality. In the spring of 1988, Iran experienced successive and severe defeats on the battlefield. Faw, Shalamcheh, and the Majnoon Islands, which had been taken in tough and lengthy operations over several years, were lost to swift enemy operations within a few months. With the war becoming more difficult and painful, Iran accepted Resolution 598.

Dekuijir, the UN Secretary-General, writes in his memoirs about US policy at this stage of the war: 'The definitive view of the United States was that to end the war: How much did the immense profits of many countries and international arms-selling companies and the various benefits on the margins of wars influence the continuation of the war? To what extent did Iranian officials, especially Foreign Ministry officials, realize the primary motives of the superpowers and the countries whose interests lay in prolonging the war? Strangely, in Iran, there was also a dominant view that diplomatic efforts to end the war were interpreted as treacherous. Could it be that we have sometimes been played and played into the hands of the superpowers?' From the notes of the banned book "Historical Points" by Jafar Shiralinia.