How did the 1979 Revolution take shape?

The 1979 Iranian Revolution was one of the most important, profound, and remarkable political transformations of the 20th century, leading to the collapse of the monarchy after nearly 2,500 years of monarchical tradition in Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. This event was a complex combination of accumulated economic crises, severe class divisions, complete political stagnation, the revival of the society’s religious identity, and the growing distance between the ruling elite and social realities. The fall of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s government occurred while he had, from a military standpoint, one of the most advanced armies in the Middle East and full support from the United States and the Western bloc—conditions that made his sudden collapse one of the most puzzling events in 20th-century social sciences.

The analysis of how this revolution formed is not a single-factor process. The overthrow of the Pahlavi regime was the result of a temporary but nationwide coalition of opposing political forces; a coalition in which religious clerics, liberal nationalists inheriting the National Front tradition, Marxist leftists, armed guerrilla groups, secular intellectuals, traditional merchants (bazaaris), and a wide range of urban social classes united around a shared demand: regime change. The charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had been in exile for nearly fifteen years, was able to mobilize these heterogeneous forces under broad slogans such as “Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic,” and ultimately accelerate the process of regime collapse in an unexpectedly short time.

In examining the formation of the revolution, historical developments can be divided into two categories: long-term structural roots and short-term triggering factors. Understanding both layers is essential to explaining why one of the seemingly most stable regimes in the region collapsed in less than thirteen months.

Long-term and structural roots of the revolution

The main sources of dissatisfaction of the society were formed decades before 1979.  Accelerated modernization policies, the concentration of power in the institution of the monarchy, and the dissociation from diverse social and intellectual forces over time led to deep rifts that all became active simultaneously in the final years.

The legacy of the 1953 coup and political closure

The first structural root of the revolution can be traced to the consequences of the August 1953 coup. The overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh’s government with the cooperation of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British intelligence service (MI6) was not only a political event but also a historical rupture in the relationship between Iran’s civil elites and the monarchy. After 1953, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s approach gradually shifted from a constitutional monarchy toward the full concentration of power in the monarchy.

The National Front, as the heir to the oil nationalization movement, the Tudeh Party as the most powerful leftist party of that period, and other political groups were either suppressed or forced underground.

The establishment of the Organization of Intelligence and National Security (SAVAK) in 1957, with the support of American and Israeli advisers, completed this system of political closure in its intelligence dimension. Over the following two decades, SAVAK became the main instrument for monitoring universities, media, political parties, and religious groups. Reports by Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists in the 1970s raised serious concerns about political prisoners and civil liberties in Iran.

The peak of this political closure occurred in March 1975, when the Shah dissolved the two state-controlled parties, “Mardom” and “Iran Novin,” and created the single “Rastakhiz Party of the Iranian Nation.” In a famous speech, he declared that those who did not agree with the party could obtain a passport and leave the country. This move, which effectively established a one-party system in Iran, also disappointed many reformist elements within the government and sections of the emerging middle class.

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The establishment of the single Rastakhiz Party in 1975, which brought political closure in the Pahlavi era to its peak.

The Consequences of the White Revolution

The “White Revolution” or “Revolution of the Shah and the People,” which was put to a referendum in February 1963, included wide-ranging reforms such as land reform, nationalization of forests and pastures, granting voting rights to women, sharing industrial profits with workers, and establishing literacy and health corps. These reforms, in some respects, transformed the traditional structure of Iranian society and improved women’s social rights and literacy in urban areas.

However, in rural areas, land reform did not achieve the expected results due to insufficient land distribution, lack of credit infrastructure and agricultural services, and the collapse of the traditional landlord–peasant system without a suitable replacement. In the two decades following these reforms, a massive wave of rural migration to the outskirts of major cities—especially Tehran—emerged. It is estimated that between 1966 and 1976, Tehran’s population grew from about 2.7 million to more than 4.5 million. These migrants, who settled in the southern suburbs of Tehran and informal settlements around major cities, later became one of the most important social bases of the 1979 protests.

The granting of voting rights to women, in the same February 1963 referendum, faced opposition from some Shia clerics led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This opposition ultimately led to the events of June 1963, which were followed by military suppression and varying reports of casualties. Khomeini was arrested after these events and, in November 1964, was exiled to Turkey and later to Najaf following a speech against the capitulation law (which granted judicial immunity to American military personnel in Iran). This 15-year exile, lasting until November 1978, led to the formation of a network of his loyal clerical followers in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and other countries—networks that became one of the most effective organizational bases of the revolution.

The Oil Shock and Economic Crisis of the 1970s

The key economic turning point in the emergence of the revolution can be traced to 1973–1974. After the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the subsequent oil embargo, oil prices quadrupled within a few months. Iran’s oil revenues increased dramatically between 1973 and 1977. Contrary to the advice of some experts in the Planning and Budget Organization, including Abdul Majid Majidi, the Shah decided to rapidly inject this massive liquidity into the economy through the Fifth Development Plan and to quickly achieve the vision of a “Great Civilization.”

This rapid injection of capital into an economy lacking the infrastructure to absorb it led to unintended consequences: severe inflation, unprecedented housing price increases in major cities, port congestion in Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur (now Bandar Imam Khomeini), where imported goods remained for months, labor shortages, increased migration of foreign workers to Iran, and widening class inequality between affluent urban groups and marginalized populations. Inflation in 1975–1976 exceeded 20%, compared to less than 5% in the early 1970s.

The government’s response to inflation became one of the most consequential decisions of this period. In 1975, amid rising prices, the government of Jamshid Amouzegar launched a “campaign against profiteering.” Tens of thousands of bazaar merchants were fined, arrested, or exiled for alleged profiteering. The traditional bazaars of Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and other cities—historically one of the most important economic and political networks in Iran with close ties to the clergy—entered into direct confrontation with the government. This historical bazaar–clerical alliance, rooted in movements such as the Tobacco Protest and the Constitutional Revolution, became one of the most important financial and organizational support networks of the 1979 revolution.

Cultural Distance Between Elites and Society

Alongside structural economic and political factors, the growing cultural gap between the ruling elite and traditional society also played a significant role. During the peak oil boom years, the contrast between the lifestyles of elites close to the court and the wider population became increasingly visible. Events such as the celebration of the 2,500-year monarchy festivities at Persepolis in October 1971, the change of the official calendar from the Solar Hijri system to the Imperial calendar in March 1976 (turning 1976 into the year 2535 Imperial), and the Shiraz Arts Festival with performances considered controversial by religious critics all contributed to rising discontent.

The calendar change, announced near the month of Ramadan, was a particularly clear example of this disconnect. Even some of the Shah’s close associates, including Asadollah Alam, expressed concern in their diaries. Ultimately, in September 1978, amid escalating protests, the government was forced to revert to the Solar Hijri calendar—an act that came too late.

During this period, Islamic intellectual movements led by figures such as Ali Shariati, Mehdi Bazargan, and Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani offered a new political interpretation of Islam to educated youth. Shariati’s lectures at Hosseiniyeh Ershad between 1969 and 1972 became one of the most influential intellectual foundations of the Islamic-revolutionary discourse. At the same time, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (founded 1965) and the Fedayeen-e Khalq Organization (founded 1971) operated as armed opposition groups, contributing to the revolutionary atmosphere, although their organizational role in the final success of the revolution was more limited compared to the clerical network.

Triggers and Accelerating Factors in 1977–1978

Despite these structural causes, the revolution would not have occurred when it did without a series of short-term triggering events.

Carter’s Human Rights Policy and Political Opening

With the election of Jimmy Carter in January 1977 and the introduction of a human rights doctrine in U.S. foreign policy, a new atmosphere emerged in Iran–U.S. relations. The Shah gradually eased political restrictions in 1977. This limited “political opening” allowed opposition forces to reorganize. Open letters by figures such as Karim Sanjabi, Dariush Forouhar, and Shapour Bakhtiar expanded political discourse, and institutions such as the Writers’ Association became more active. The “Ten Nights of Poetry” at the Goethe Institute in Tehran in October 1977 drew thousands and created a new space for cultural dissent.

This atmosphere sent a clear message: the government no longer enjoyed unconditional U.S. support. Even if this perception was not entirely accurate, it significantly emboldened opposition groups.

Death of Mostafa Khomeini

On November 1, 1977, Mostafa Khomeini, the eldest son of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, died suddenly in Najaf. While the official cause was reported as a heart attack, supporters of Khomeini suspected SAVAK involvement. The exact circumstances remain unclear.

The political impact, however, was significant. Memorial gatherings were held across Iran, particularly in Qom, Mashhad, Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan. Khomeini described his son’s death as “a hidden divine blessing,” and his name returned to the center of political attention.

The Ettela’at Newspaper Article

A major turning point came on January 7, 1978, when the newspaper Ettela’at published an article titled “Iran and the Red and Black Colonialism” under the pseudonym Ahmad Rashidi Motlagh. The article insulted and criticized Khomeini. The publication—widely believed to have been approved by the court—provoked outrage in Qom.

On January 9, 1978, large protests in Qom led to clashes with security forces. Official reports cited a small number of deaths, while opposition accounts claimed dozens. Later historical research suggests around 6 to 9 confirmed deaths. This event, known as the “Qom incident,” triggered a new wave of nationwide protests.

The Cycle of Forty-Day Mourning Protests

According to Shia tradition, memorial services are held forty days after a death. This tradition became a mechanism for sustaining protests. On February 18, 1978, a major protest in Tabriz marked the forty-day memorial for Qom victims, resulting in violent clashes with security forces. The cycle continued from city to city, creating a nationwide wave of protests that spread throughout 1978.

The Final Escalation

By mid-1978, the crisis had reached a point where political concessions and repression could no longer control it.

Cinema Rex Fire

On August 19, 1978, a fire at Cinema Rex in Abadan killed around 400 people. In the tense political atmosphere, opposition groups blamed SAVAK, while the government accused radical religious activists. After the revolution, perpetrators linked to Islamist militants were prosecuted and executed in 1979–1980, but the event had already significantly damaged the legitimacy of the Pahlavi government.

Black Friday (September 8, 1978)

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The September 8, 1978 massacre in Jaleh Square in Tehran, known as “Black Friday,” which eliminated any possibility of political reconciliation.

Strikes and the paralysis of the state apparatus

From October 1978 onward, a widespread wave of labor and employee strikes paralyzed the vital arteries of the Pahlavi government. The strike of oil workers in Abadan, Ahvaz, Aghajari, and other oil-rich regions in December 1978 brought Iran’s oil exports to nearly zero and cut off the regime’s main source of revenue. Government employees in customs, railways, telecommunications, banks, and even journalists joined the strike wave. These extensive strikes, organized through a network of strike committees and supported financially by the bazaar, became one of the most powerful tools of pressure against the government in the final months.

The exile of Ayatollah Khomeini to France

In the autumn of 1978, the Shah pressured the Iraqi government—then led by Hassan al-Bakr with Saddam Hussein as vice president—to expel Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from Najaf. On October 5, 1978, Khomeini left Najaf. After an unsuccessful attempt to enter Kuwait, he arrived on October 6 in Neauphle-le-Château near Paris.

What initially appeared to be a victory for the Pahlavi government became one of its greatest strategic mistakes. In Neauphle-le-Château, Khomeini gained unprecedented access to global media. Major international outlets—including Le Monde, The Times, The Guardian, The New York Times, and French, American, and German television networks—interviewed him daily.

During this period, figures such as Abolhassan Banisadr, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Ebrahim Yazdi, and Sayed Jalaleddin Farsi played key roles in communicating with international media and translating Khomeini’s messages.

Khomeini’s audio messages, distributed on cassette tapes in Iran and played in mosques and religious centers across the country, became one of the most influential revolutionary media tools. This phenomenon—later described by sociologist Asef Bayat and others as the “cassette revolution”—illustrated a bottom-up media strategy in a revolutionary movement.

Military governments and the Bakhtiar coalition government

In the final months, the Shah made several attempts to contain the crisis. In September 1978, Jafar Sharif-Emami was appointed prime minister and announced a policy of “national reconciliation,” but his inability to control the protests led to his resignation.

In November 1978, the Shah appointed General Gholamreza Azhari as prime minister and formed a military government. This government also quickly proved incapable of controlling the crisis.

Finally, on January 6, 1979, Shapour Bakhtiar, a well-known figure from the National Front and a long-time opponent of the regime, was appointed prime minister. Although initially seen as a strategic political move, the appointment was rejected by his former colleagues in the National Front. Karim Sanjabi and other leaders expelled Bakhtiar and condemned his acceptance of the post as a betrayal of the revolutionary movement at that time.

The Shah’s departure and Ayatollah Khomeini’s return

On January 16, 1979, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Empress Farah left Iran for Egypt. Contemporary accounts describe widespread celebrations across Iranian cities. The newspaper Ettela’at published its famous headline “The Shah is Gone,” which became a lasting symbol in collective memory.

Bakhtiar, newly appointed as prime minister, took unprecedented steps to regain public trust: dissolving SAVAK, releasing political prisoners, lifting press censorship, and promising free elections. However, in the midst of a revolutionary surge, these measures came too late.

On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran after fifteen years of exile, arriving at Mehrabad Airport aboard an Air France flight accompanied by around 120 international journalists. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered along the route to Behesht-e Zahra cemetery.

At Behesht-e Zahra, Khomeini delivered a historic speech in which he declared: “I will appoint the government with the support of this nation.” This statement effectively challenged the legitimacy of Bakhtiar’s government.

On February 4, 1979, Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan as head of the provisional government. From this point on, Iran effectively had two parallel governments.

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 Return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Iran after 15 years of exile, which led to the formation of a parallel phase alongside the provisional government and Bakhtiar’s administration

Final victory (February 8–11, 1979)

The final days of the revolution began at the Doshan Tappeh Air Force base. On February 8, 1979, a group of air force technicians (homafaran) who supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared their support for the revolution. On February 9, the Imperial Guard was deployed to suppress them, and armed clashes broke out between the two sides. Civilians and revolutionary armed groups, including members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization and the Fadaian-e Khalq Organization, quickly joined the homafaran, and weapons stored in the base fell into the hands of the public.

On February 10, armed clashes expanded across Tehran to police stations, military barracks, and government buildings. Shapour Bakhtiar declared martial law in Tehran that night. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called on the people to ignore martial law and take to the streets.

On the morning of February 11, 1979, the Supreme Military Council, chaired by General Abbas Gharabaghi, held a meeting. At the end of the session, the army announced its neutrality and ordered troops to return to their barracks. This decision effectively marked the collapse of the Pahlavi government.

With the military withdrawn, around 2 p.m. Radio Iran—recently taken over by revolutionary forces—broadcast the historic message: “This is Tehran, the voice of the true people of Iran, the voice of the revolution.” Key government institutions, including the Prime Minister’s office, the national broadcaster, and Evin Prison, fell into revolutionary control. Shapour Bakhtiar fled the country. With these developments, the Pahlavi monarchy officially ended after 53 years (1925–1979), marking the beginning of a new era in Iran.

Main actors of the revolution

Understanding the 1979 revolution is impossible without recognizing the diversity of forces involved. It was a multi-voiced uprising in which a wide range of political and ideological groups participated, although power after the victory became concentrated in one faction.

Clergy and mosque networks: The Shiite clerical network, centered on Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Najaf and later Paris, formed the organizational backbone of the revolution. Inside Iran, figures such as Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Beheshti, Morteza Motahhari, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Javad Bahonar, and others played key roles in organizing opposition networks.

National Front and liberals: Figures such as Karim Sanjabi, Dariush Forouhar, and Shapour Bakhtiar represented the National Front and liberal-nationalist tradition. They briefly aligned with the revolutionary coalition during its final phase.

Religious-nationalist movements: The Freedom Movement of Iran (Mehdi Bazargan, Ebrahim Yazdi, etc.) acted as a bridge between religious and modern political thought and played a major role in international communication during the revolution.

Armed leftist groups: Organizations such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (founded 1965) and the Fadaian-e Khalq (founded 1971) engaged in armed struggle against the Pahlavi regime and participated in the revolutionary atmosphere, although their role in post-revolution power was limited.

Bazaar merchants and traditional middle class: The traditional bazaar networks in Tehran and other cities provided financial and logistical support for strikes and protests, maintaining a historic alliance with the clergy.