Memoirs of Akbar Hashemi – June 21, 1985

At 7:00 a.m., I held a consultation meeting with my accompanying delegation regarding the topics up for discussion. Afterward, five Iranian students studying here came to see us; they were not particularly satisfied with their situation. At 9:00 a.m., we went to lay a wreath at the memorial for the martyrs of the Italian occupation, and then proceeded to the Tripoli airbase to fly to Benghazi for a meeting with Gaddafi.

The rest of the delegation traveled on a different plane, while we flew in a small Falcon jet; en route, Mr. Jalloud provided information regarding Libya’s air force and missile capabilities. He spoke about the economic situation, and we outlined our wartime needs: surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and anti-tank missiles, as well as PMP pontoon bridges.

We arrived at Benghazi Airport shortly before 11:00 a.m. amidst an official reception. While waiting in the airport lounge for the rest of the delegation to arrive, we were briefed on Libya’s social system—the *Jamahiriya* (State of the Masses). "People's Congresses" comprising the general public exist throughout the country to decide on important issues; their decisions are forwarded to the General People's Congress at the center, and proposals backed by the majority of the local congresses become law. They claim to have no parliament, ministries, hierarchy of superiors and subordinates, or administrative bureaucracies; in reality, while they may have rejected the labels, the actual structures remain in place.

From the airport, we traveled to a location on the outskirts of Benghazi to meet with Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of the Libyan Jamahiriya. He was stationed in the desert inside a large, nomad-style tent, with several camels and horses nearby. It was hot inside the tent. He came to the entrance to welcome us, carrying himself like a leader. I introduced my accompanying delegation; a few stayed while the others left, and the talks began.

Mr. Gaddafi spoke at length. Adopting the persona of an ideologue, he discussed the significance of the structure of Libyan society—the *Jamahiriya*—and criticized the conventional form of democracy, which we too have adopted. He offered a perspective rooted in a tribal worldview regarding the rejection of the Shia and Sunni sects in favor of "pure Islam," and presented a flawed analysis of the conflicts involving Imam Ali (AS) and Mu'awiyah, as well as Imam Hussein (AS) and Yazid.

He bitterly attacked Mr. Nabih Berri for inciting Lebanon's Amal organization to fight against the Palestinians. Finally, he urged us to fight Saddam using people's war and guerrilla tactics—or otherwise end the war—while expressing his support. He noted that his Foreign Minister, Mr. [Dr. Ali Abdussalam] Treiki, had been slighted by Saddam during a recent visit to Baghdad; this snub had caused them to recoil from their recent misguided shift toward the "axis of reaction" and their posturing against Syria.

For my part, I spoke at length about the war, the issues concerning Lebanon and Israel, and the Steadfastness Front, urging them to cooperate more closely in supporting us in the war. I also spoke about the need for full vigilance against the plot to fracture the "Resistance Front" by exploiting issues in southern Lebanon, as well as the necessity for greater cooperation between Libya and Syria in the face of Arab reactionaries; I deferred addressing his erroneous historical and intellectual claims to another time. However, I briefly remarked that regarding historical, intellectual, and ideological matters—which fall within the expertise of us seminarians—it would be best to leave the judgment to us. We were exhausted, so we concluded the meeting.

To resolve the restrictions on our movement, I went to Mr. Gaddafi’s residence, located next to his tent. For rest and lunch, we were taken to a garden that was part of the palaces from Libya’s former regime; most of my companions were taken to a hotel, while only Mr. Velayati, [Mohsen] Rafiq-Doust, Mehdi, and a few Revolutionary Guards accompanied me.

In the afternoon, I went with Dr. Velayati and Mr. Rafiq-Doust to Gaddafi’s tent to continue the negotiations. On the way, we were taken to various locations. Mr. Gaddafi complained about the visit to Iran by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal—which had taken place without Libya’s knowledge—and expressed dissatisfaction that we had not yet fired a single missile at Saudi Arabia, stating that he had expected us to strike the country. He emphasized the importance of cooperating with Iraqi opposition groups and proposed sending our pilots to Libya for training on Russian aircraft—to be used against Iraq in the future—and requested an outline of our overall war strategy and objectives.

I provided convincing explanations, and it was agreed that my companions would arrange the implementation of the agreed-upon principles with Mr. Jalloud. It was a productive meeting. We returned to the residence—formerly the palace of Libya’s Crown Prince, the nephew of King Idris; we were told he currently lives in Tripoli as a private citizen. That evening, members of our delegation came from the hotel to join us for dinner; they complained—rightfully so—about having been kept waiting by the Libyans at the hotel earlier that afternoon.

A group of Sudanese Muslims arrived and briefed us on the situation in Sudan. They expressed satisfaction with the military officers who had ousted [Jaafar] Nimeiry and proposed that we release the Sudanese prisoners captured during the war with Iraq. I told them that if the Sudanese government announced the recall of its military personnel from Iraq, we would take steps [to release the Sudanese prisoners]. Late at night, we returned to Tripoli on two planes. We arrived at the hotel at 1:00 AM and went to sleep, exhausted. Yasser and Mehdi arrived a short while later.