Zarif: Lavrov says the snapback is wrong, saying that not having a peaceful relationship with the world is a red line for Russia for Iran!/ The Russians both reported on Hajj Qassem's visit to Moscow and revealed the sending of Iranian drones to Russia

Mohammad Javad Zarif: Not only was the snapback not intended for the final days of the negotiations, but it was also not limited to my discussions with John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State. Mr. Lavrov and the French presented a proposal regarding the status of past UN Security Council resolutions against Iran, which was very bad, and we made a lot of efforts to set that proposal aside.

Americans never harm bears, and they will bear whenever they can. One day we saw Mr. Kerry holding a piece of paper and proposing that we suspend the resolutions for six months, that is, we should go to the Security Council every six months, and although it was automatically renewed, at the request of two members of the Security Council, it could have been put to a vote that if that had happened, the JCPOA would have ended six years ago. I said to Carrie, "What's your suggestion?" "Are you insulting my sense?" she said, "No, I'm not insulting your sense. He knew that Mr. Lavrov and I had been friends since 1994.

In 2020, while Iran was not fulfilling any of its JCPOA commitments, the United States wanted to trigger the snapback mechanism. Thirteen members of the Security Council sent a letter stating that the U.S. could not do so, and in the vote, 11 members abstained while Russia and China voted against it. Incidentally, the only time Russia and China sided with Iran was during my tenure because, during Mr. Ahmadinejad's time, Russia had voted in favor of all Chapter VII Security Council resolutions, and that very Russia had prevented Iran's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization due to Iran's presence under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Mr. Lavrov seems to have forgotten this.

In this very book, there are confidential documents showing that the United States and five other powers claim that our tool is the Security Council, and even Mr. Lavrov was saying in the decision-making session, 'I will not allow you to take away our veto power.' Now he says that Zarif went and did this, of course, up until now I have held back and said nothing.

Lavrov says I was against the arms embargo on Iran, while when I went into the meeting, Javad told me that they won't give you a permit for more than 5 years. Will you accept it or not? I said no. He said, "Then why are you taking our time? Don't you have a permit from Tehran?" I firmly said, "It has nothing to do with you." That night, the JCPOA ended and we agreed that Lavrov had been ordered not to let the JCPOA be finalized, so he went to Russia for an interview and said that we were against the arms embargo and Zarif forced us to accept it. Now we are quoting the same thing internally.

The Russians reported on Hajj Qassem's trip to Moscow and revealed the sending of Iranian drones to Russia during the war in Ukraine, while I held talks with Hajj Qassem in both Iraq and Turkey, but nothing was leaked.

I still believe in strategic relations with Russia and China, but they are not doing anything for us. The Russians openly express their policy. Russia is an important country in our neighborhood, but it has two red lines: first, Iran should never have peaceful relations with the world, and second, it should not come to conflict with the world. That is why Russia was in favor of the temporary Geneva agreement because it would keep the bone in the wound and prevent conflict.

Of course, many in Iran were also saying that the interim agreement was good, but as soon as we started the comprehensive negotiations, the Russians started playing. In the interim agreement, we had said that our enrichment needs were for Bushehr and 190,000 sou, and that is why we want Natanz. In February 2013, at the beginning of the comprehensive negotiations, the Russians said that we would supply all of Bushehr's needs until the end of Bushehr's life, meaning they drew a line under our needs.

We said, "Are we going to always need the Russians?" They said, "We will not allow Iran to put its produced fuel in Bushehr, and if it does, we will not confirm the nuclear security of Bushehr, because they knew that if the JCPOA is finalized, Iran's relations with the world will be normal, and normal relations between Iran and the world are a red line for the Russians." All of this is documented in the book "Raz Sar Be Mehr."/ IRNA