We forget quickly

Jafar Shir Alinia

In the last days of July 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini bitterly accepted Resolution 598 and said to drink the cup of poison.
Two weeks later, Hashemi Rafsanjani's phone rang. President Khamenei from Khuzestan was behind the line. He asked Hashemi to allow military forces to operate in Khuzestan. The war seemed to be over and the new operation could be a fresh start to the conflict. Hashemi Rafsanjani: "I said that the possibility of a conflict without a proper goal and many casualties goes to both sides and in addition, it requires the Imam's permission; In addition to examining expediency." (The end of defense, the beginning of reconstruction; p. 249)

The president also followed up the issue with Ahmad Khomeini. President Khamenei: "Of course, I did not say to tell the Imam. We discussed with Ahmad Agha himself to create a pressure. But Ahmad Agha said that I should go and tell the imam and see what his opinion is. (War History Journal; No. 10, p. 24)

The story was that Iraq had accepted Resolution 598 a year before, but was surprised by Iran's sudden acceptance. And he declared that Iran is not honest in accepting the resolution and intended to deceive the Iraqi army. Three days after Iran accepted the resolution, Saddam's army launched attacks on the south and west fronts on July 22.

People's groups rushed to the front and stopped the Iraqi army, but the Iraqis took many prisoners, and maybe that's why they came to have a bigger hand in the negotiations after the ceasefire. On July 25, the army of the hypocrites attacked the western borders of the country, which were also stopped and suppressed.

In the following days, IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei, who seemed to be ecstatic about the presence of troops on the front, prepared a plan to attack Saddam's army forces. President Khamenei, who had come to the front line after many years, liked Mohsen Rezaei's plan. Iraq had not yet accepted the ceasefire and was under international pressure to accept the ceasefire; Iran's attack could have been an excuse for him.

When Ahmad Agha got an answer from Imam, he could not find President Khamenei. He left a confidential message for him in the Khuzestan Governorate: "Hazrat Hojjatul Islam Khamenei is a fool." After the greeting, I conveyed your message to the Imam that the warriors are ready to operate. Hazrat Imam said that you should not attack the territory of Iraq under any circumstances. Don't even shoot at them. If they bombed, you also give the order to bomb if you see fit. You have a ready force, in case they attack and capture land, you attack them too. I have stated that the adoption of the resolution is not tactical. The attack is a violation of it. There is no ceasefire before and after. disciple Ahmad Khomeini." (War History Journal; No. 10, p. 24)

Iran's attack was ruled out, but Iran's phase change from the height of despair to an aggressive situation is a very important point. Two weeks ago, Iran accepted Resolution 598 after catastrophic failures. Two days after that, Hashemi wrote in his memoirs: "Mohsen Rezaei came." is sad He cried a little. I consoled him. is ready to resign; I told him to stay on his side. He was scheduled to have a television interview tomorrow to deny the rumor of his arrest." (The end of defense, the beginning of reconstruction; p. 222)

The president had also seen the chaos of the situation closely. And a few days before this decision, on one of the front lines, a fighter grabbed Mr. Khamenei's collar and said, "Why didn't you come two years ago?" Mr. Khamenei: "Sir, now that we have come, brother, now come to Kota." While they were arguing, the enemy bombarded the surrounding area. Mr. Khamenei: "It was a warning to me and him, not to take each other's neck here."

He explained this issue a day before in a meeting with the commanders, and interestingly, the meeting of the commanders was also full of challenges, questions and doubts. And there the commanders were highly critical of the performance of the government of which Mr. Khamenei was the president. It was there that Mr. Khamenei emphasized: "You may say, isn't the government under the supervision of the president?" No, the answer is no. And he said to the commanders: "I did not accept the prime minister." He said, but because the imam had appointed him, he has supported him until now. The strangest sentence was: "The war is not my responsibility, not now, not yesterday. Let me tell you that since 1983, I have not had any responsibility in the war."

The question here is whether it is possible to focus on the number of the population and step into a new battlefield with forces whose minds are occupied with thousands of questions, challenges, and uncertainties? And if such an operation was carried out, where would the fate of the war lead?