"Masoud's Government"

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-Thursday 2024/10/10 - 20:30
News Code:6596
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Finally, Mr. Pezeshkian, as the head of the government and tasked with forming the "cabinet," succeeded in obtaining a vote of confidence for his ministers from the principlist parliament, despite a sharply critical environment and serious opposition from some hardline principlists known as the "Resistance Front." This, in itself, is somewhat hopeful.

However, the hope for success in this vote does not stem from the colleagues themselves, but rather from the more overt involvement of the Supreme Leader. This view suggests that Ayatollah Khamenei has personally engineered the elections this time and intends (for whatever reason) to place one of the individuals favored by the reformist movement in the presidency, fulfilling his demands skillfully and methodically with the help of a candidate trusted by Khatami and other reformists. Although this theory has existed since the beginning and sometimes emerged in the form of news, there has been no clear evidence to support it.

While the essence of this claim (if it is indeed correct and plausible) is significant, it remains to be seen what Ayatollah Khamenei actually intends to do. Does he really want to change his style of governance? Does he agree with Mr. Pezeshkian’s views, as stated repeatedly in his televised campaign speeches? Does he intend to allow his executive deputy (wrongly referred to as the "President") to address those concerns? More precisely, does Ayatollah Khamenei concur with the President in acknowledging the vast chasm that has emerged between the government and the people, which could potentially lead to the downfall of the ruling system, and that action must be taken? Will priorities such as addressing the people's livelihood issues, lifting sanctions, reducing tensions in global relations, and respecting at least the minimum civil rights (such as the implementation of optional dress codes) be realized in the fourteenth government? This remains hard to believe.

Unfortunately, we have long since returned to the era of the Qajar dynasty, in the sense that if an unexpectedly reformist Prime Minister emerged, he would first have to convince the Supreme Leader, and a decree from "the sovereign" would be required before any action could be taken. However, such actions would often halt midway. The bitter fate of reformists like Mirza Abolqasem Farahani, Mirza Taghi Khan Amir Kabir, Sepahsalar, Mirza Ali Khan Amin al-Dowleh, and finally Mohammad Mossadegh is a testament to these failed reformers. After the revolution, the fates of reformists like Khatami and others who sought even minor changes in domestic and foreign policy also reflect these failures. Throughout all these periods, there has been no individual who has truly emerged as a President elected by the direct votes of the people. In all these instances, even the minimum demands of the people promised during the electoral campaigns of candidates have not been realized. This is because the highest-ranking official, who possesses absolute power yet remains unaccountable, has not deemed it appropriate for the demands of the public to be fulfilled.

In reality, the phenomenon of dual governance emerges from the dual structure of the legal system of the Islamic Republic. In any case, it remains to be seen whether Ayatollah Khamenei has genuinely reached the conclusion that he needs to show some flexibility and give the President more leeway.

While it is possible that Pezeshkian, out of necessity or naivety, has disclosed secrets and explicitly stated that, in forming the cabinet, he has not only dealt with the tools of the clerical regime—namely the IRGC and security institutions, and the Speaker of Parliament—but, more importantly, that the Supreme Leader has not only supported and endorsed him but has even directly asked certain individuals to accept ministerial positions. This public acknowledgment in Parliament is unprecedented and may have been coordinated so that everyone understands who holds the command, ensuring that at least the hardliners know their voices will not be heard (although it is possible that some form of division of labor has taken place).

For now, Pezeshkian's government remains "Masoud's Government," but we shall see what happens. I will try to remain optimistic and want to believe that positive changes are on the way. It won’t be long before we receive clear answers. I hope the answers are indeed clear!

Hassan Yusefi Ashkouri  
Wednesday, August 31, 2024

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