Memoirs of Akbar Hashemi – March 5, 1987

I woke up at six in the morning. Mr. Sanjaghi informed that the progress in the south of the canal was limited and that they had retreated in two or three axes after breaking the enemy's line. Tharullah's 41st Division has progressed; Overall, this division and the 27th Division did the best work at this stage.

I listened to the Farsi news of Radio [Voice of] America. He quoted the text of Reagan's speech about the White House scandal. He admitted his mistake and failed and took responsibility and promised to make amends. Overall, he spoke very weakly. I don't think it can solve any problem.

Mr. Hosni Saadi informed that this morning a camp in Haj Imran [operational area] was repelled from the enemy and the number of prisoners reached 235 people. I encouraged him. In the evening, another camp was repelled from the enemy by capturing a prisoner and a tank.

In the evening, we went south through Abadan and saw Darkhovin Atomic Energy Plant. We were supposed to cross the Karon River from Darkhoin Bridge; The bridge was removed due to the increase of water due to rain. We returned to Ahvaz. We passed through the city and reached Khatam camp at quarter past eight.

Until half past two in the morning, we negotiated with the commanders of the IRGC divisions. Each of them told how they fought in the current week. The progress is low and the reason for this was the vigilance of the enemy, the presence of obstacles and weak coordination with the neighboring units, and some also cited the weakness of their own facilities and the high fire of the enemy.

Although we have succeeded in capturing a part of the west of Mahi channel, but it was much less than expected and disproportionate to the amount of casualties. It was decided to stop the attack for two or three days. We arrived at golf at quarter past three in the morning.

After the quick and extensive victories in the first days of the Karbala operation, the battle has become five problems. Firstly, because of the situation of the land, swamps, palm trees, fish channel and the situation of the islands inside Arvand, and secondly, because of the vigilance of the enemy, and thirdly, because of the proximity to Basra and the sense of serious danger for the Iraqi regime, and the concern of the countries in the south of the Persian Gulf about the fall of Basra and Iran's proximity to them, and fourthly, because of the concern of Saddam's eastern, western and regional supporters in changing regional equations, with Iran's complete control over the northern Persian Gulf and huge resources. its oil and for this reason they act with open arms in providing facilities, information and propaganda to Saddamian. Our repeated and successful operations in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the cooperation of the Iraqi Kurds themselves, fuel their concern.

American President Reagan's frank statements, after learning about Iran's progress in the Karbala 5 operation, clarify everything well. After condemning Iran's operation in Shalamcheh, he says: "America considers the development of this conflict as a major threat to its interests in the Persian Gulf and.... We share the concern of our friends in the Persian Gulf region about the possible expansion of the war and the threat to their security..."