Memoirs of Akbar Hashemi – February 2, 1987

I woke up at five in the morning. I read the reports and listened to American and British Farsi radios. The scandalous issue of the US in relation to Iran is still an issue of the day. The new hostage taking in Lebanon is creating a crisis. The smell of evil comes from America. Iran's remarkable victory in the fifth Karbala operation and the threat to Basra has made the three camps of the West and the East and the reactionaries more serious in supporting Saddam.

We got information from Moghadam camp. It turned out that they did not have an important encounter. They have come out of Salehiya Island completely and destroyed the bridges behind them. We decided to negotiate with Nasr's commanders at Khatam camp.

We had a chance until the evening. We went with our companions to the city of Shushtar, one hundred kilometers from Ahvaz. On the way, we saw two power plants, Ramin and Zargan. We passed through villages and towns. We passed through fields almost all the way. It is a populated area, but we saw only a few palm trees on the way. We walked through the streets of Shushtar and found the city crowded and crowded. We are worried about bombing it and other cities. On the way back, we stopped outside the city under a tree and ate lettuce. We went back to golf for lunch. Mehdi took the phone of the house, I talked to the house.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, we went to Khatam camp. Mr. Shamkhani and Rahim Safavi explained the situation of the front and the justification of the withdrawal from the west of the Mahi canal and Salehiya, which was not acceptable in the case of Salehiya. Regarding the fish channel, my opinion is that there has been a lack of consolidation and annexation from the beginning.

After prayer and dinner, the army ground force commanders came. They proposed four limited operations in the western and northwestern regions. Mr. Rezaei said that it is better for their facilities to come to the south and support the IRGC. I said we will postpone the decision.

Then the commanders of the armies of Muhammad Rasoolullah (S), Karbala and Al-Ghadir, who are sitting back from the west of the canal, came and gave explanations to convince us that it was not possible to stay. In general, we agreed that they could not stay in the existing conditions. Although, if they had tried from the beginning, they could have provided the conditions for joining other forces and consolidating their positions.

Then the continuation of the operation was discussed. Their opinion was that it would be possible to continue after the arrival of the Mahdi Corps forces and their organization, and for the time being we should be satisfied with the defense in the current lines. Our point was, with the pressure that is on us due to the bombing of the cities, the stagnation of the front cannot be tolerated. Mr. Rezaei's opinion was that we can act as much as the force is gathered.

Some of them were of the opinion that we should wait until enough forces arrive and launch a large-scale attack. It was discussed until midnight. Their insistence was to get facilities from the army and they considered success conditional on the existence of more artillery, tanks and personnel carriers. We reached golf at one o'clock in the morning and slept. Mehdi went to the FAW front.