Abdi Media's exclusive guests

All the levers of power are in the hands of this 15-20 percent, and they run the country.

Neither the Islamic Republic nor the US government wants to return to the battlefield.

The attack on Iran was against international law.

Mehrdad Khansari: The removal (or sidelining) of Ayatollah Khamenei has created a situation in which, if our nation is vigilant...

Mehrdad Khansari: The nature of the current dissatisfaction of the people is different from the past.

The people wanted more political freedom, which was not available at that time.

The Shah intervened in two areas: matters related to foreign policy and military matters and the defense of the country.

During the time of the Shah, dissatisfaction could be curbed by providing financial facilities to the people.

Mehrdad Khansari: Our country, at the time when Mohammad Reza Shah came to the throne, was a poor country.

It is very clear that the Islamic Republic is at one of the most sensitive historical junctures. Therefore, we are going to discuss an issue that is important for the future of Iran, and the topic of our conversation is the structure of power in Iran. We know that after the attacks that took place in recent months, and after the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei and the transfer of leadership in a very strange and extraordinary process to his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, many now believe that the Islamic Republic has entered its third generation. Although to this day, we have not seen any live voice, image, photo, or even a live signature from the new leader. Has Iran entered the era of a military-security government? And can the new architecture of power stabilize the Islamic Republic system and the nascent system of Mojtaba Khamenei, or will new crises arise?

Mehrdad Khansari: The biggest weakness of the Islamic Republic is the lack of development and the creation of public dissatisfaction.

The skill he had in construction, he did not have in "crisis management".

History is a testing ground for power, and in this testing ground, nations have repeatedly faced similar questions: when a political system enters a phase of erosion, or when for many it becomes conditional and reform is no longer enough, and for many the question arises as to when the survival of a government becomes its greatest issue, and more importantly, for many the question arises as to when the future separates from the past. Today, Iran is in one of the most sensitive periods of its contemporary history: the American and Israeli attack and the war that has changed the equations of the region, the killing of the second leader of the Islamic Republic, the emergence of the third leader of the Islamic Republic, changes in the balance of power within the establishment, the increasing role of security and military institutions, the intensification of political rifts, the current negotiations with the United States, and simultaneously, the return of the discussion of alternatives to the center of attention, and the return to a question that has loomed over Iranian politics for decades: Will the Islamic Republic pass through this historical turning point? If not, how will Iran's future be shaped?

If the government continues its practice of raids, imprisonments, and house arrests, what we were worried about happening through a foreign attack will instead occur through "social collapse."

We are in an emergency situation in which the law is not observed.

Hossein Bayat: When the leader of the Islamic Republic is assassinated in the first second of the war, it means we are naturally in an emergency situation.

The theoretical foundations of the Islamic Republic are fraught with conflict and contradiction.

If there is to be a discussion of "transition," then the issue of "war" — which has already been defeated — must be raised again.

I want to speak on Abdi Media about one of the most complex and tense arenas of Iranian politics — a space between war and freedom, between the opposition and power, and between truth and the politics of commerce; about a society that has for years been suspended between anger, fear, hope, revenge, freedom, and collapse, and now stands at a point where it is simultaneously afraid of war, afraid of the continuation of the status quo, and afraid of a future of which it still has no clear image. In years when Iran is simultaneously entangled in internal crisis, external pressure, the threat of war, and the collapse of public trust, great questions remain — questions whose answers many might find important to know: Who truly speaks for Iran?

If you had understood, you wouldn't have relied one bit on foreign interference!