Important note from Hamid (Naser) Sarmandi, former Deputy of Security at the Ministry of Intelligence

In a note dated June 15, titled "Points Regarding the Upcoming Elections," I raised four questions and three assumptions, indicating that the government's approach to approving Pezeshkian was unexpected and inconsistent with the analytical foundations based on understanding its authoritarian nature.

Now, with the election fever subsiding and the final output of Pezeshkian's cabinet composition—which reflects his approach and capacities—it has become clear that our fundamental analytical framework regarding the recognition of the core of genuine power is valid. The acceptance of a candidate from the reformist front by the Supreme Leader (despite the negative opinion of the Guardian Council) was merely a tactical retreat aimed at garnering legitimacy through increased participation as much as possible.

Although this goal was not achieved with the anticipated fifty percent participation, it is clear that relative engagement from various ethnic groups, minorities, political factions, and social elites somewhat alleviated the crisis of the regime's lack of legitimacy, providing a breath of fresh air for the next steps.

Now, with Pezeshkian's evident inability to understand the complex layers of power and politics and his lack of appropriate capacities for negotiation regarding the arrangement and composition of the government—illustrated by the unexpected and incongruous cabinet he introduced—it is effectively the harvest season for the core of genuine power to utilize this opportunity to restore its status.

The main motivation for this writing is not to address the unforeseen deficiencies of the cabinet introduced to the parliament or the ambiguous performance of the President, which may be discussed in an independent text. Instead, the purpose is to focus on and acknowledge the traditional understanding of the regime's behaviors and the continuation of the same path and practice to maintain control over the machinery of power.

Contrary to some friends' views and analyses suggesting the regime's tendencies towards change and a shift from traditional approaches to adopt reformist methods, it is unfortunate that we must now add this new experience to previous knowledge—that the regime continues on the same path as before and shows no desire for change.

If the governance of the country continues to be based on a security and military perspective, the windows of hope for reform will once again narrow, and opportunities for reconstruction will be lost. In conclusion, as I have repeatedly stated, I remind this important point: the world of politics is subject to no certainties. Perhaps Mr. Pezeshkian, in his future steps, can restore the hope created in the elections and renew the shattered trust of his companions during the elections with a thoughtful approach.

Perhaps events may unfold in such a way that the conditions for realizing the key slogan "Iran for all Iranians" can be provided. Hoping for that day.

Dated August 10, 2024, Naser Sarmandi.